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At a recent judicial conference, televised by C-SPAN, a panel 
of jurists discussed the problem of the burgeoning case load facing 
the federal courts! and possible responses to that problem. One 
panelist called for the creation of Article I courts2 and the use of 
administrative agencies to handle and decide certain cases, thus 
freeing the Article III judiciary3 to concentrate on the "important" 
cases (e.g., antitrust, securities, etc.). When asked to identify the 
type of cases that fell outside the "important" case category, Judge 
Stanley Sporkin identified social security cases and actions brought 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").4 
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law; J.D., 
1984, The University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Magna Cum Laude, 1980, Wil­
berforce University. I acknowledge and wish to thank Dean Kenneth C. Randall and 
the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for supporting my research leading 
to this and other works. I also acknowledge the ongoing patience, support, and encour­
agement of my spouse and best friend, Karen Faye Thmer. 
1. On the federal courts' burgeoning caseload, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). 
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (Congress shall have the power "[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"). The Tax Court is an example of an Article I 
court. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDI­
CIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 247 (1990); POSNER, supra note 1, at 26. 
3. Article III of the Constitution provides that: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu­
ance in Office. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "Article III defines not only the judicial power of the United 
States but who may exercise it: judges who have lifetime tenure and are guaranteed 
against any reduction in salary." POSNER, supra note 1, at 25-26. 
In addition to Article I and Article III courts and judges, there are thousands of 
non-Article III federal judges, including administrative law judges, military judges, and 
federal magistrates. [d. at 26. 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For Judge Sporkin's 
views on this subject, see Stanley Sporkin, Reforming The Federal Judiciary, 46 SMU L. 
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I am troubled by the view that Title VII cases are not as impor­
tant as cases arising under other federal statutes, and I am con­
cerned that acceptance of that view could relegate Title VII to a 
subordinate status. In enacting Title VII, Congress declared that 
the federal courts have jurisdiction over actions alleging conduct 
prohibited by that statute, that individuals who have been aggrieved 
by certain discriminatory practices have rights and remedies, and 
that one significant aspect of this nation's myriad laws and public 
policies is the prohibition of discriminatory conduct in the 
workplace. 
On the Monday following my viewing of the conference, I 
made my way to work in a downtown Chicago law firm. Riding the 
El, I noticed that virtually all of the booth agents, conductors, driv­
ers, and maintenance personnel were African-Americans. Stopping 
off in a fast food restaurant to purchase a breakfast sandwich, I ob­
served that all of the workers behind the counter were African­
Americans. When I arrived at work and stopped off in the mail 
room to pick up legal pads and sundry supplies, I saw what I had 
seen before and obviously knew-that virtually all of the mail room 
personnel were African-Americans. But a different picture 
emerged when I looked at the racial composition of the firm's law­
yers; of the hun<;lreds of lawyers in the firm, the number of African­
American attorneys could be counted on one hand (without using 
all of the fingers on that hand). 
What accounted for the high level of African-American partici­
pation and representation in the transportation, fast food, and mail 
room jobs and the low level of representation in the ranks of the 
law firm's attorneys? Were these representation levels reflective 
and indicative of the historical and ongoing reality of occupational 
stratification in the nation's workplaces?5 What role does (or 
should) Title VII play in addressing such stratification? 
As we mark the thirtieth anniversary of the enactment of Title 
VII, it is both timely and appropriate to take another look at the 
statute and its use. In this Article, I argue that, given the extant 
definitions of "discrimination" violative of Title VII and the gov­
erning concepts and principles pertinent to Title VII litigation, the 
statute, as currently interpreted, administered, and enforced, can­
not have a substantial impact on the equal employment rights and 
REv. 751, 757 (1992) (stating that cases involving TItle VII and other federal statutes 
are overloading the federal court system). 
5. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text. 
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opportunities of many in the African-American6 community7 who 
are its intended beneficiaries. In making this point, I do not con­
tend that Title VII has been completely ineffective relative to the 
employment opportunities of African-Americans. I do contend 
that an assessment of the real world impact of the statute reveals 
that Title VII's purposes and aspirations are riot being met, perhaps 
cannot be fully met, and that absent a change in the approach to, 
and analysis of, antidiscrimination law, the impact of Title VII will 
continue to be limited. 
Given that view, it is time to take another look at the assump­
tions that have become ingrained in our thinking, understanding, 
and expectations regarding the purpose and application of Title 
VII. As discussed below,8 our current conception of actionable 
"discrimination" must expand beyonq the "I fired (or did not hire, 
or did not promote) her because she is black" paradigm. Few are 
the employers who are unsophisticated or brazen enough in this day 
and age to engage in such overt discrimination. Instead, present 
6. While my focus here is on the impact of Title VII's regulatory regime on Afri­
can-Americans, I recognize that other groups in America (women, African-American 
women, Latinos, Native Americans, and other people of color) have been and are sub­
jected to discrimination. While it can be argued with some force that a focus on Afri­
can-Americans does not and cannot address the question of discrimination in all its 
forms and dimensions, I have chosen to focus on African-Americans, knowing that the 
analysis and discussion may not fully apply to all groups protected by Title VII. See 
Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies 
for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1674-75 (1991) 
(suggesting that discrimination should not be discussed exclusively as an African-Amer­
ican problem). 
7. In using the term "community," I recognize that the African-American com­
munity is not a monolithic entity. "[T]here has never been a monolithic black commu­
nity or even a myth of one-ask Elijah Muhammad and Martin Luther King, Jr., or Dr. 
Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, and Marcus Garvey." Michael Thelwell, False, Fleet­
ing, Perjured Clarence: Yale's Brightest and Blackest Go to Washington, in RACE-lNG, 
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 86, 94-95 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). "[W]hat 
there has been is massive and close agreement at the center." Id. at 95. See Anthony 
Cook, Critical Race Law and Affirmative Action: The Legacy of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., 8 HARV. BLACKLElTER J. 61, 73 (1991); see also Toni Morrison, Introduction: 
Friday on the Potomac, in RACE-lNG, JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON 
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY vii, 
xxx (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) ("It is clear to the most reductionist intellect that black 
people think differently fr()m one another; it is also clear that the time for undis­
criminating racial unity has passed."); Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its 
Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1817 (1992) (ar­
guing that the black community is now more of an idea or ideal than a reality; while 
"the ubiquitous experience of racism provides the basis for group solidarity, differences 
of gender, class, geography, and political affiliations keep blacks apart"). 
8. See infra notes 130-257 and accompanying text. 
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and future discussions of Title VII and discrimination in the work­
place must recognize and take account of the realities of subordina­
tion, subjugation, racial stratification, and the real world deficits in 
many African-Americans' exposure to and acquisition of human 
capital and job skills-realities shaped by and flowing from past 
and present discrimination. We must ask" 'how does race alter the 
contours of legal reality?"'9 It is also imperative that we under­
stand that the efficacy of antidiscrimination laws and the legal doc­
trines interpreting and applying those laws will be affected by other 
"people's policies"lo that generally shape the skill, dexterity, and 
judgment of those individuals comprising and participating in the 
labor pool. 
This discussion will proceed as follows. Part I provides an 
overview of specific and significant events in the history of race and 
the law.ll Part II discusses the provisions of, and the procedures set 
forth in, Title VII and examines the way the statute is currently 
used in the workplace. In Part II, I discuss the view that the statute 
is now principally used to protect the rights of incumbent employ­
ees who allege that their employer has engaged in discriminatory 
conduct. While such use of Title VII is important, the protection of 
incumbent employees does not promote an acknowledged purpose 
of the statute-the opening of employment opportunities to Afri­
can-Americans (and other groups). The prevailing use of Title VII 
falls far short of that statutory purpose.12 Part III addresses a "less 
9. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 966 (1993). 
10. John T. Dunlop, To Form a More Perfect Union, 9 LAB. LAW. 1 (1993). As 
stated by Professor Dunlop: 
By "people's policies" is meant the following measures taken in combination 
that generally shape the "skill, dexterity and judgment" of labor that is ap­
plied: (1) primary and secondary education; (2) training and retraining; (3) 
health care; (4) family policies; (5) housing policies; (6) management methods 
in applying the labor force at the workplace; (7) relations between manage­
ment and labor organizations; and (8) the quality of public service and govern­
ment regulations as they relate to the work force. The list could be extended 
to include criminal justice, environment, economic development and a number 
of other topics .... 
Id. at 1-2. 
11. Again, my focus here is more specifically on African-Americans, the regula­
tory regime of Title VII, and the application of that statute to discrimination in the 
workplace. 
12. See George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REv. 1463, 
1479 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992»; see also infra notes 102-29 and 
accompanying text. 
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familiar conceptual question-what do we mean by 
discrimination?"13 
Part IV then examines and critiques two recent works which 
noted the ineffectiveness of antidiscrimination law and proposed 
provocative changes in the legal approach to discrimination. Pro­
fessor David Strauss has proposed that every firm be required to 
employ minoriti~s in proportion to their percentage in the national 
popUlation, and that employers who do not comply with this re­
quirement be sanctioned by fines.14 Professor Derrick Bell's most 
recent book discusses a "Racial Preference Licensing Act." Under 
that act, employers and others could obtain a license authorizing 
the license holder to exclude or separate persons on the basis of 
color if the holder paid "to a government commission a tax of 
[three] percent of the income derived from whites employed, whites 
served, or products sold to whites."15 Finally, I conclude that the 
current regime of Title VII, with its dependence on litigation and 
judicial interpretation, will have a limited impact with respect to 
increasing the employment and employment opportunities of Afri­
can-Americans. 
I. RACE AND THE LAW 
The "problem of the color line"16 has been and continues to be 
one of the most pressing issues facing this natioriP Beginning in 
August 1619 (when John Rolfe wrote into the journal of James­
town, Virginia: "about the last of August, there came to Virginia a ­
Dutchman of Warre that sold us twenty negers"),18 the presence of 
13. Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 
104 HARV. L. REv. 1157, 1159 (1991). 
14. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991). 
15. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 48 (1992). 
16. W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES 23 
(Faucett Publications, Inc. 1961) (1953); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE: LEG­
ACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (1993); JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. 
Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (6th ed. 1988). 
17. If one somehow forgets the presence and reality of racism in this country, a 
reminder is sure to come in the form of a racial epithet, the denial of a promotion, 
incidents of racial harassment, or the savage beating of an African-American (Rodney 
King and many others) and the resulting riots. 
18. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Looking for God 
and Racism in All the Wrong Places, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 191, 193 (1993); see A. LEON 
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 20 (1978); Bryan K. Fair, Foreword: Re­
thinking the Colorblindness Model, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 13 (1993). 
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individuals who are black ("them") on the soil of America ("our") 
and in the midst of whites ("us") raised fundamental questions rela­
tive to notions of equality, rights, antidiscrimination principles, and 
the like. 
Throughout the history of this nation, the "problem of the 
color line" has arisen in various forms and contexts and has been 
accompanied by a corresponding set of assumptions and myths con­
structed by those in power to justify the subordination of blacks. 
Even though the Declaration of Independence declared, "[w]e hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,"19 
the author of that document, Thomas Jefferson, owned approxi­
mately 175 slaves.2o 
Ten provisions in the original Constitution (which did not ex­
plicitly refer to slavery or race )21 directly or indirectly dealt with 
slavery.22 The Constitution prohibited any congressional interfer­
ence with the slave trade before 1808,23 and blacks were described 
as "other persons"-to be considered three-fifths of a human be­
ing-in that most revered document.24 The "peculiar institution" of 
19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
20. Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal 
Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1018 (1993). Jefferson did liberate eight 
slaves during his lifetime. Those persons freed were the children and grandchildren of 
his father-in-law, John Wayles. Id. at n.66 (citing Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: 
"Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 181,204-07 (Pe­
ter S. Onuf ed., 1993». 
21. I use the term "race" because that term is commonly used in discussions of 
discrimination, and for the sake of convenience and familiarity. I note, however, that 
the term "race" is a modern European construct, (see CORNEL WEST, KEEPING FAITH: 
PHILOSOPHY AND RACE IN AMERICA xii (1993», and "that there is only one biological 
race and that is the human race." Darlene Clark Hine, "In The Kingdom of Culture": 
Black Women and the Intersection ofRace, Gender, and Class, in LURE AND LoATHING: 
ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY, AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILATION 337, 338 (Ger­
ald Early ed., 1993). The use of the word "race" in this culture actually refers to the 
"social construction of differences. Race, class, and gender are not only the only factors 
that shape identity, but they are, even more to the point, potent indicators of an individ­
ual's relation to power." Id. at 339. 
22. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE 3 (1987); DONALD E. LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE 4-5 
(1992); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA: 1760-184862-63 (1977). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 1. 
24. See id. at § 2, cl. 3; LIVELY, supra note 22. See generally ROBERT A. 
GOLDWIN, WHY BLACKS, WOMEN, AND JEWS ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE CONSTITU­
TION, AND OTHER UNORTHODOX VIEWS (1990). 
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American slavery25 was justified by paternlllism26 and by a racialist 
theory of congenital inferiority which posited that blacks were ge­
netically and intellectually inferior to whites27 and. were "the less 
than human negro."28 This "mytho-narrative"29 view of African in­
feriority was not based on nor defended by "science" or a "philo­
sophical case for the innate moral and intellectual inferiority of the 
black race."30 The view of African-American inferiority pre-dated 
the founding of this nation, shivery, and American apartheid.31 
Black persons were treated as non-humans under the law.32 In 
1857, the Supreme Court of the United States held that blacks were 
property and were not citizens under the Constitution.33 Indeed, 
stated the Court, blacks had been "regarded as beings of an inferior 
order ... altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in 
social or political relations ... and ... they had no rights which the 
white man was bound to respect."34 And since the Civil War was 
fought to preserve the Union and not to free the slaves,35 the equal­
25. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956). . 
26. See William W. Fisher III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1051 (1993). The paternalist theory, which I reject, depicted South­
ern society . 
as a whole as patriarchal and humane. Social and economic relations in the 
region, so the argument went, are vertical and reciprocal. Inferiors obey and 
respect their superiors and are rewarded with support and sustenance. Slavery 
is just one component (albeit an important component) of this essentially feu­
dal system. Masters enjoy the labor and obedience of their slaves, but provide 
them in return food, housing, moral and religious guidance, and care in their 
infancy and old age. The net result is a stable, familial, and mutually beneficial 
labor system-which contrasts favorably with the brutal and tumultuous wage 
labor system used in the industrializing North. 
Id. at 1065 (footnote omitted). 
27. See BELL, supra note 22, at 156; DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND 
AMERICAN LAW 11 (1980); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED Es­
SAYS 1938-1988325 (1989); STAMPP, supra note 25, at 197-236; Fisher, supra note 26, at 
1066. 
28. Higginbotham & Francois, supra note 18, at 193. 
29. Reginald L. Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the Violent 
Discourse Between Korean and African-Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 15, 18 n.4 (1993) 
(citing ERNST CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTIi 3-4 (Susanne K. Lenger trans., 1953)). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original 
Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39,78. 
33. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857). 
34. [d. at 407; see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTf CASE: ITS SIGNIFI· 
CANCE IN LAW AND POLITICS (1978). 
35. As stated by President Lincoln: "My paramount object in this struggle is to 
save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union 
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ity and liberty of blacks was not the animating force in that conflict. 
During the First Reconstruction (the period between 1863 and 
1877),36 the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
were added to the Constitution,37 and Congress enacted civil rights 
legislation. But the First Reconstruction was unable to survive the 
politics of that time, and the Supreme Court invalidated the early 
civil rights laws.38 The First Reconstruction was ended by the Black 
Codes in the southern states39 and by the Supreme Court's endorse­
ment of the separate but equal doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson,40 
wherein the Court constitutionalized American apartheid.41 Law­
ful and constitutional segregation was justified by those imposing it 
on blacks by the myth of the "happy and contented negro."42 
The Second Reconstruction (which commenced in either 1945 
or 1954 and ended at some point during the period between 1976 
and 1989),43 was a period of many significant developments. The 
without freeing any slave I would do it." See Arthur S. Miller, Pretense and Our Two 
Constitutions, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 388 n.48 (1986) (quoting letter from Abra­
ham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862), reprinted in 5 COLLEcrED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 388 (R. Basler ed., 1953» (emphasis omitted). 
36. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 
1863-1877 (1988). The term "reconstruction, in the civil rights context, is a short-hand 
description of the legal, political, and social efforts to eliminate slavery and the racist 
legacy of slavery captured in the Dred Scott philosophy." Robert Belton, The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 and the Future of Affirmative Action: A Preliminary Assessment, 41 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1992). 
37. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV. 
38. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 
1974); Belton, supra note 36, at 1093. 
39. See HAROLD HYMAN & WILLIAM WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 315­
19 (1982). 
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
41. The Plessy Court stated: 
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions 
based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in 
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political 
rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or 
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the 
United States cannot put them upon the same plane. 
Id. at 551-52. 
42. Higginbotham & Francois, supra note 18, at 193. 
43. The Second Reconstruction commenced in either 1945, or in 1954, the year 
the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See 
MANNING MARABLE, RACE REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUC­
TION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990 (1991). The Second Reconstruction ended at 
some point between 1976 and 1989. See Belton, supra note 36, at 1095. The argument 
for 1989 as the ending date for the Second Reconstruction is based on the Supreme 
Court's 1988 Term, wherein the Court ruled against plaintiffs in a number of civil rights 
and employment discrimination cases. See Mark S. Brodin, Reflection on the Supreme 
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defeat of the racial superiority principle of the Nazis in World War 
II and the "revelations of Nazi atrocities created a more sympa­
thetic environment for minority organizations and others who had 
long challenged racial discrimination in the United States."44 But 
African-American soldiers returned to the United States after fight­
ing and risking their lives for their country to find continuing dis­
crimination and violent, rascist attacks in the South.45 
However, in the competition between the United States and 
the Soviet Union for the minds and allegiances of the Third World, 
American efforts to address discrimination within its borders pro­
vided this country with credibility in that ideological struggle.46 
Rosa Parks refused to move to the back of the bus,47 the civil rights 
movement gained momentum,48 and the Supreme Court decided 
Brown v. Board of Education,49 overturning, at least as a matter of 
law, the doctrine of separate but equal. 
Any discussion of discrimination on the basis of race, including 
this discussion of Title VII, must take account of the incontrovert­
ible facts of two hundred and fifty years of slavery, eighty years of 
legally enforced subordination of African-Americans, and past and 
present social norms that have kept African-Americans "in the low­
est status, least remunerative jobs, and [have] denied them the 
chance to move up the occupational ladder."50 A very large 
number of African-Americans "still suffer from the tragic sequelae 
of Plessy."51 The consequences of the history and the reality of ra­
cism are manifest; many African-Americans face ever worsening 
poverty, unemployment, serious illness, drug addiction, decreasing 
Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of 
the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1 (1989). 
44. ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 40 (1993). 
45. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Conver­
gence Dilemma, 93 fuRV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980). 
46. Id.; see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. 
L. REV. 61 (1988). 
47. "I had decided that 1 would have to know once and for all what rights 1 had as 
a human being and a citizen." See JAMES M. BURNS, THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT: 
THE CROSSWINDS OF FREEDOM 348-49 (1990) (quoting Rosa Parks). 
48. Repression of the civil rights movement was rationalized with the myth of the 
"violent and communist negro." Higginbotham & Francois, supra note 18, at 193. 
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
50. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 
1060, 1073 (1991). 
51. Robinson, supra note 29, at 47 (quoting A. Leon Higginbotham, An Open 
Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1000, 1010 (1992». 
228 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:219 
life expectancy, increasing homicide rates, crime, incarceration, in­
fant mortality, housing, toxic and hazardous environments, re­
stricted access to mortgages and financing, and inadequate 
education.52 
This last subject, education, is of particular importance to the 
issue of employment. The gap between the college attendance rates 
of blacks and whites has grown since 1980, the quality of schools 
attended by African-Americans has declined, and segregation has 
denied many blacks access to· quality schools and valuable influ­
ences.53 "As a consequence, great numbers of blacks are prepared 
neither for college nor for the labor market. It seems likely that 
black wages will continue to lag behind white wages as long as black 
schooling lags behind white schooling."54 To the extent that racial 
segregation or under-representation in the work force continues, 
they will "evoke strong images of an earlier racial hierarchy . . . 
[and can] ignite latent racism in some whites, particularly the young 
or inexperienced. "55 
Can the law adequately address and rectify the consequences 
and ravages of de jure and de facto discrimination and subordina­
tion? More specifically, can federal employment discrimination law 
and public policy make or facilitate changes in the workplace which 
will address the status quo, and deter or remedy unlawful 
discrimination? 
II. TITLE VII 
The problem of the color line and the debate over the meaning 
of equality have important implications for the workplace. 
Most of us work in order to live, and our standard of living and 
sense of self-worth are determined by the work we are able to do. 
Anything which limits employment options, whether by restrict­
ing our opportunities or expanding someone else's at our ex­
pense, is a matter of ~eep concern.56 
52. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT 121 (1993); Adeno 
Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2253,2256-57 (1993); Richard Delgado, Zero­
Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on Behalf of the 
Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEO. L.J. 1929 (1990). 
53. Nan L. Maxwell, The Effect On Black-White Wage Differences of Differences 
in the Quantity and Quality of Education, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 249 (1994). 
54. Id. 
55. Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 49 (1990). 
56. Steven R. Greenberger, A Profluctivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991,72 OR. L. REV. 253,255 (1993); see also ELLIS COSE, THE 
RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS: WHY ARE .MIDDLE-CLASS BLACKS ANGRY? WHY 
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A. Pre-Title VII Social Indicators 
The deteriorating economic well-being of African-Americans 
dl:1fing the 1940s and 1950s (and, of course, in the period before and 
after those two decades) is a real, indisputabie;and unfortunate fact 
of life. African-Americans did not share in this nation's post-World 
War II economic surge,57 and were disproportionately laid off or 
demoted after the end of that war. 58 By 1958, black unemployment 
had reached double. digits and was generally double the rate of 
white unemployment.59 Deputy Secretary of Labor W. Willard 
Wirtz testified before congressional committees that the American 
work force was not employed efficiently or democratically; that in 
the years immediately following World War II the black unemploy­
ment rate was approximately sixty percent higher than the white 
unemployment rate; that in June 1963, the official white and black 
unemployment rates were 5.1 % and 11.2%, respectively; and that 
black workers were increasingly vulnerable in an economy that was 
moving toward a technical and service-oriented base.60 In the sum­
mer of 1963, the federal Census Bureau released a study showing 
that black income was approximately fifty-five percent of white in­
come; that in most states non-white males had the same occupa­
tional distribution relative to whites that the non-whites had in 1940 
and 1950; and that in the South the earnings of non-whites were 
only one-third of those of whites with similar jobs and schooling.61 
B. The Enactment of Title VII 
On July 2, 1964, Congress enacted many civil rights laws, in­
cluding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act").62 
SHOULD AMERICA CARE 55 (1993) (the continuing relevance of race takes on special 
force in the workplace "partly because so much of life ... is defined by work"). 
57. HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RICaITS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 100 (1990). 
58. Robinson, supra note 29, at 43 n.99. 
59. Id. at 43 n.98. 
60. Id. at 101; see Hearings, Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 443-57 (June 6, 1963) (Testimony of Secre­
tary W. Willard Wirtz). 
61. GRAHAM, supra note 57, at 101; Hearings, Subcommittee on Employment and 
Manpower, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 321­
88 (July 31, 1963) (Testimony of Herman P. Miller). 
62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at various 
sections of the United States Code). For discussion of the events leading to the enact­
ment of the Act, and particularly Title VII, see BLUMROSEN, supra note 44, at 40-52; 
PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL 
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"[T]he plight of the Negro in our economy"63 was one of Con­
gress' primary concerns. As stated by one senator, "[t]he rate of 
Negro unemployment has gone up consistently as compared with 
white unemployment for the past [fifteen] years. This is a social 
malaise and a social situation which we should not tolerate. That 
is one of the principal reasons why the bill should pass."64 
Senator Humphrey, a key supporter of the Act, stated that the crux 
of the problem of discrimination was to open employment opportu­
nities for blacks in occupations traditionally closed to them, "and it 
was to this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial dis­
crimination in employment was primarily addressed."65 
Title VII66 has been described as one of the most significant 
pieces of civil rights legislation ever enacted by Congress.67 One 
section of Title VII provides that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer­
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ­
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli­
gion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli­
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN lHE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1985); 
GRAHAM, supra note 57. 
63. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,202 (1979) (quoting 110 CONGo 
REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey». 
64. Id. (quoting 110 CONGo REC. 7220 (statement of Sen. Clark». 
65. Id. at 203; see 110 CONGo REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); see 
also Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. V. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986) 
("Congress enacted Title VII based on its determination that racial minorities were 
subject to pervasive and systematic discrimination in employment."); CHRISTOPHER 
JENCKS, RElHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND lHE UNDERCLASS 3-4 
(1992) ("[T]he provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that barred racial discrimina­
tion in employment were also meant to help equalize economic opportunity."); Ruther­
glen, supra note 12, at 1465 (The laws against employment discrimination "were 
designed to open jobs to groups excluded from them."). 
66. See generally BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIS· 
CRIMINATION LAW 933-1185 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing various aspects of Title VII 
litigation). 
67. Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 
RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 921 (1993); Hubert H. Humphrey, Preface to the First Decade of 
Title VIl of the Civil Rights Act: Past Developments and Future Trends, 20 ST. LoUiS U. 
L.J. 219 (1976) (commemorating the tenth anniversary of Title VII). 
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cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na­
tional origin.68 
Title VII also created an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission").69 The Commission is 
composed of five members, appointed by the President with the ad­
vice and consent of the Senate, for a term of five years. The Presi­
dent designates one commissioner to serve as the chairman and one 
member to serve as the vice chairman. The President also appoints, 
again with the advice and consent of the Senate, a general counsel 
who serves a four-year term and has responsibility for the conduct 
of litigation.70 Declining to grant cease and desist authority to the 
EEOC, Congress decided that the federal courts would be responsi­
ble for enforcement of Title VII.71 However, Title VII does em­
power the EEOC to prevent any person from engaging in specified 
unlawful employment practices.72 
When a charge of unlawful discrimination is filed with the 
EEOC by or on behalf of an aggrieved person alleging that an em­
ployer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the EEOC 
serves notice of the charge on the respondent and investigates the 
matter.73 If the EEOC determines that there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the charge is true, the EEOC "shall endeavor to elimi­
nate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal 
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."74 On aver­
age, the time required for the investigation of a charge and the rea­
sonable cause determination is 280 days, with another 255 days for 
conciliation efforts to obtain voluntary compliance and settlement 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). TItle VII also prohibits discrimination by em­
ployment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)­
(d) (1988). 
69. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4(a) (1988). 
70. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4(a), (b) (1988). 
71. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974); Belton, supra 
note 67, at 921-22. The 1972 amendments to TItle VII authorized the EEOC to seek 
judicial enforcement of the statute. Id. at 922; 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(c) (1988). 
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for the language of 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e-2(a) (1988). 
73. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
[T]he [EEOC] or its designated representative shall at all reasonable times 
have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any 
evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to 
unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to 
the charge under investigatioI).. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988). The EEOC also has the power to issue subpoenas. 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-9 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (1993). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
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in reasonable cause determinations.75 If the Commission is unable 
to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer, 
the general counsel determines whether to recommend to the Com­
mission that a civil action be brought against the employer (a pro­
cess which takes approximately (orty days). The Commission will 
then take another forty days to decide whether the matter should 
be litigated in federal court.76 The EEOC may bring a civil action 
against the employer in the appropriate district court,77 and the ag­
grieved party has the right to intervene in the action.78 "Thus, the 
average case spans more than 600 days from the filing of the charge 
until the case is referred to the General Counsel to prepare to bring 
suit. This is the average processing time; some stages may take 
twice as long. "79 
If, after the investigation, the EEOC determines that there is 
not reasonable cause to believe that the charge has merit,80 it "shall 
dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to be 
aggrieved and the respondent of its action."81 The matter may not 
end there, however, as EEOC enforcement of Title VII is not exclu­
sive. A charging party may bring a civil action in federal court once 
a charge is dismissed. In addition, if the EEOC has not filed a civil 
action within 180 days from the filing of the charge or has not com­
75. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary 
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457,480-81 (1992). 
76. Id. 
77. During the debate on' the 1972 amendments to Title VII, conservative and 
liberal members of Congress differed on the question whether Title VII should be en­
forced by EEOC court actions or by cease-and-desist orders like those issued by the 
National Labor Relations Board and enforced by the federal courts of appeals. See 
WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 41 (1977). Proponents of EEOC court action urged, inter alia, that 
enforcement of Title VII could be sabotaged by the presidential appointment of unsym­
pathetic and politically motivated commissioners. Id. Proponents of the cease-and­
desist method argued, inter alia, that the expertise of the commissioners would be 
greater than that of the court, and that the commissioners would be more sympathetic 
to claimants. Id. 
The 1972 amendments empowered the EEOC to pursue federal court actions, and 
also provided that individual plaintiffs have the right to sue if the EEOC dismissed their 
charge or took no action in their case. Id. 
78. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988). 
79. Summers, supra note 75, at 481 (footnote omitted). 
80. Reasonable cause findings are issued in less than five percent of all Title VII 
charges filed with the EEOC. Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The 
Court at the Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981 and tlie Meaning ofPrecedent, 37 EMORY 
L.J. 949, 988-89 & nn.153-54 (1988). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
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pleted its investigation or filed a civil action,82 an aggrieved party 
may file a civil action.83 
A Title VII plaintiff complaining of intentional discrimination 
may request a trial by jury and may seek punitive and compensa­
tory damages.84 Where a court finds that an employer has engaged 
in an unlawful employment practice, the court may enjoin the em­
ployer "from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and 
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate," including re­
instatement of employees or hiring of applicants with or without 
back pay, or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri­
ate.85 In addition, a court may allow the prevailing party86 attor­
neys' fees (including expert fees) as part of costS.87 
C. The Impact of Title VII 
There is general agreement that Title VII had a definite impact 
on the nation's workplaces in the decade immediately following its 
enactment.88 Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
employers eliminated many longstanding employment practices 
that had limited opportunities for African-Americans and other mi­
norities, and the relative income of black workers began to rise 
82. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 66, at 946-47,1168; Summers, supra note 75, 
at 481. . 
83. It should also be noted that Congress gave EEOC commissioners the power 
to file their own discrimination charges, as well as the power to file charges challenging 
a pattern or practice of discrimination. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-5(b),-6(e) (1988). 
84. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(a), (c) (Supp. IV 1992). The sum of compensatory and pu­
nitive damages are limited based on the size of the employer. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3) 
(Supp. IV 1992). 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988). Backpay liability cannot accrue from a date 
more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earn­
ings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discrimi­
nated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. [d. 
86. The law excludes the Commission and the United States from this provision. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
87. [d. 
88. See John Bound & Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Progress: Erosion 
of the Post-1965 Gain in the 1980's?, in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL 
INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 32 (Steven Shulman & William Darity, Jr., 
eds., 1989); John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic 
Change: The Impact ofCivil Rights Policy on the Economic Status ofBlacks, 29 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1603 (1991); James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Im­
pact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of 
South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 138 (1989). 
For a different view, see James Smith & Finis Welch, Black Economic Progress 
after Myrdal, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 519 (1989) (education and migration were the 
primary determinants of long-term black economic improvement). 
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sharply.89 Even Professor Richard Epstein (no fan of Title VII)90 
acknowledges that a substantial increase in black participation in 
the labor force "followed quickly on the heels of the introduction of 
Title VII."91 Accrding to Epstein: 
Virtually all of that increase [in black participation] is attributa­
ble to the removal of formal barriers to entry, both public and 
private. The early enforcement efforts were relatively easy. Fed­
eral officials took on the most obvious targets which offered the 
greatest civil rights gains through direct administrative attacks on 
explicit discriminatory practices, public and private. Here the il­
legality of the conduct was so patent that most firms would desist 
without a real fight, seeing that it was one they could not win .... 
Large employers ... whose formal rules were in violation of Title 
VII were the first to comply, for they offered big targets and had 
the resources to pay any fines and back pay orders that might be 
entered against them.92 
Professor Fran Ansley has pointed out that after the passage of 
Title VII, "traditionally excluded groups obtained relief in broad, 
aggressive litigation that for a time characterized the new era of 
antidiscrimination law."93 But, Professor Ansley notes, "the scale 
of overall progress made, and the amount of race and gender strati­
fication still remaining are both serious disappointments."94 
While Title VII had a positive impact on the employment pros­
pects of some African-Americans, and has been effective to the ex­
tent that employers no longer openly admit to excluding African­
Americans, women, and other people of color in the manner and to 
the degree they did prior to Title VII,95 racial stratification in the 
nation's workplaces continued and continues to exist today. Afri­
can-Americans are over-represented in certain occupations (includ­
89. Black earnings and wages relative to white earnings and wages increased be­
ginning in the mid-1960s, with the South experiencing the greatest African-American 
advance during the period 1960-1970. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 88, at 1606. 
90. See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EM­
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS] (chal­
lenging the accepted basis for, and advcating the repeal of, employment 
antidiscrimination laws); Richard A. Epstein, Should Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 Be Repealed?, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 349 (1993) (same). 
91. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 90, at 252. 
92. Id. 
93. Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's 
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1759 n.7 (1993). 
94. Id. at 1760 n.7. 
95. See generally John J. Donohue III, The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy 
on the Economic Status of Blacks, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 41 (1991). 
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ing nursing aides, orderlies, bus drivers, and correctional officers )96 
and are under-represented in others (including engineering, law, 
medicine, architecture, journalism, and waiters).97 
African-American rates of unemployment have historically 
been much higher, and labor-force participation lower, than the 
white rates of unemployment and labor-force participation.98 Many 
inner-city black males suffer from long-term joblessness. "An in­
ner-city man may be jobless for a long time because he is pro­
foundly discouraged about his employment prospects, or because 
he is dissatisfied with the quality of jobs he thinks he can get, or 
because he supports himself with illegal activities."99 African­
American males also experience unemployment on a frequent 
basis.loo 
The critical point is that the presence or absence of African­
Americans in certain offices, businesses, and occupations is viewed 
as, and therefore becomes, "normal" in the sense that it is accepted 
and perhaps even expected by society. We should worry that the 
daily experiences of African-Americans, other people of color, and 
whites convey the message that African-Americans "belong" in cer­
tain so-called "lower level" positions, and that they do not or can­
not hold the so-called "higher level" jobs and occupations. Can 
Title VII address, provide a remedy for, and change the stubborn 
reality of occupational stratification?lOl In pondering that question, 
96. African-Americans, who constitute 10.1% of the total work force, make up 
approximately 31 % of nursing aides and orderlies, 23% of bus drivers, 23% of correc­
tional officers, and 9.5% of hotel clerks and retail salespersons. ANDREW HACKER, 
Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 111 (1992). 
97. African-Americans make up 4% of reporters and editors, 3.6% of engineers, 
3% of physicians, 3.2% of lawyers, 1 % of architects, and 4.7% of waiters. Id. Professor 
Derrick Bell has noted that work as a waiter or waitress is not an elite occupation and 
does not require sophisticated training. BELL, supra note 22, at 6. 
The suspicion arises that proprietors of restaurants and lounges may feel that 
their white clienteles do not want their food and drinks handled by black em­
ployees. Or it could stem from the belief that if a place has "too many" blacks 
on its staff, it will drop to a lower status. 
Id. 
98. Robinson, supra note 29, at 76. From 1973 through 1986, the average real 
earnings of African-American males under the age of 25 fell by 50%, and the percent­
age of black males aged 18 to 29 in the labor force and securing full-time employment 
fell from 44% to 35%. MANNING MARABLE, THE CRISIS OF COLOR AND DEMOCRACY: 
ESSAYS ON RACE, CLASS AND POWER 19 (1992). 
99. E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospects for "Putting 
America to Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. L.J. 2003, 2006 (1993). 
100. Id. at 2007. 
101. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. 
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it may be helpful to focus on the extant use of Title VII in employ­
ment discrimination litigation. 
D. Extant Use of Title VII 
In 1966, charges of unlawful discrimination in hiring outnum­
bered charges of discriminatory discharge by fifty percent. By 1985, 
the relationship had been reversed, with termination charges out­
numbering hiring charges by more than six to one.102 The ratio dur­
ing the period 1989 to 1991 was approximately seven to one.103 
During fiscal years 1982 through 1989,61.9% of all EEOC charges 
alleged discrimination in layoffs or terminations, and 10.3% alleged 
discrimination in hiring.104 In fiscal year 1993, a record number of 
charges were filed with the EEOC. The agency received nearly 
88,000 charges of employment discrimination, with race discrimina­
tion alleged most frequently105 (49.6% of all charges).106 
These figures reveal that Title VII, originally envisioned as a 
tool for opening employment opportunities for African-Americans, 
women, and other people of color, is now overwhelmingly used to 
protect the existing positions of incumbent employees.107 Since 
that has become the principal use of the statute, employers face a 
diminished risk of Title VII hiring suits, and may have no real in­
centive to promulgate and implement employment practices that 
address possible discrimination in hiring. 
What factors explain the declining use of Title VII in hiring 
matters? Some have argued that there is now less discrimination in 
hiring.1OB Others point to the real world disincentives of suing an 
102. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employ­
ment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991). 
103. Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover 
and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 403, 411 n.23 (1993). 
104. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employ­
ment Discrimination Litigation over Tthe Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709, 725 
(1993). 
105. Charges of Disability Discrimination Boost EEOC Intake By 22% in Fiscal 
'93, BNA DAILY LAB. REP. at D4 (Jan. 13, 1994). Thirty-six percent of the charges 
alleged discrimination on the basis of race; sex discrimination was alleged in 27% of the 
charges, with sexual harassment claims making up 8.3% of all charges; age discrimina­
tion was alleged in 22.6% of the charges; and disability discrimination was alleged in 
17.4% of all charges. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 984. 
108. See, e.g., Michael Fix, et aI., An Overview ofAuditing for Discrimination, in 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 
237 1994] TITLE VII's REGULATORY REGIME 
employer. An applicant who has not been hired is less likely to sue 
an employer than an incumbent employee who has an established 
relationship with the company.l09 Further, an applicant who is not 
hired by a company may be less likely to suspect, and most likely 
will not be in a position to shape, and prove, a claim of discrimina­
tion. The applicant's contact with the employer may be limited to 
the filing of an application or a short interview, the applicant will 
not be familiar with the racial or sexual makeup of the employer's 
work force, the applicant may not know the reasons for the decision 
not to hire her or who made that decision, and the applicant will 
have to continue her job search. If she finds other employment, she 
may not wish to pursue an action against the company that rejected 
her application.110 An applicant contemplating a Title VII charge 
and action must also consider the fact that such litigation can con­
sume two or more years of her life, that she may not be able to 
afford legal counsel,111 and that proving discrimination will be diffi­
cult to uncover and prove as a matter of law. As to the last point, it 
should be noted that African-Americans are not likely to win Title 
VII cases,112 particularly when such cases are tried before judges 
instead of juries.l13 
Another concern relative to using Title VII to protect incum­
bent employees is that the law may provide employers with a net 
disincentive to hire minorities and women.114 
A worker who is not hired in the first place is obviously in no 
position to bring a future firing suit. Thus, an employer must 
9 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993) (arguing that blatant discrimination 
has waned). 
109. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1024-25. 
110. Yelnosky, supra note 103, at 412. 
111. As stated by Professor Yelnosky: 
Because these [lower-skilled, entry-level] jobs typically pay lower wages, the 
plaintiff may have difficulty paying a lawyer. Relying on a contingent fee 
agreement also may be problematic because the lower wages used to generate 
a back-pay award may not compensate a lawyer adequately. Finally, attor­
neys' fees are available only to prevailing parties. The difficulty and expense 
of proving a discrimination claim involving hiring for a lower-skilled, entry­
level position will deter many attorneys from relying on the possibility of re­
covering attorneys' fees to accept a case. 
Id. at 412-13 (footnotes omitted). As pointed out by Professor Yelnosky, it is "too early 
to tell whether the amendments to Title VII permitting awards of compensatory and 
punitive damages will tend to make attorneys more available in cases offering no hope 
of a substantial back-pay award." Id. at 412-13 n.35. 
112. Culp, supra note 9, at 985. 
113. Becker, supra note 6, at 1681. 
114. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1024. 
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consider the increase in expected costs when he hires a female or 
minority worker, because some probability exists that the worker 
will be fired and will sue. . . . The greater the likelihood that the 
worker will ultimately be fired, and the higher the probability of 
a firing suit, the greater are the expected costs imposed by hiring. 
With the enormous increase in discharge cases, the probability 
that a worker will bring a discriminatory firing suit is now sub­
stantially higher than the probability that a worker will bring a 
failure to hire SUit.115 
On that view, the net effect of antidiscrimination litigation on the 
hiring of minorities and women may be negative,116 for an "appli­
cant who is not hired is not in a position to bring a subsequent firing 
suit, and these cost savings must also be included in the employer's 
calculation of the effect of failing to hire an applicant."117 If this 
view is correct, the expected effects of Title VII would include a 
reduction in the number of African-Americans employed118 and a 
small increase (or even a decrease) in the average wages of African­
American workers when the average includes those who are em­
ployed and those who are not employed.H9 
The notion that the probability of a discriminatory firing suit 
will act as a disincentive with respect to the employment of African­
Americans (and presumably others protected by Title VII) should 
be examined more carefully. According to one study, only about 
one percent of those individuals who believed that they had been 
discriminated against even consulted a lawyer.12o Thus, instead of 
"too many" Title VII actions, the reality is that there may have 
been "too few" actions filed. l2l Moreover, while the volume of fed­
eral employment discrimination litigation has increased many times 
faster than the overall federal caseload122 (indeed, between fiscal 
year 1970 and fiscal year 1989, the employment discrimination 
caseload rose by 2166%),123 this growth does not mean, as a general 
matter, that employers in general have experienced a significant 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1025; accord Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of 
Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1987). 
117. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1026. 
118. Posner, supra note 116, at 519. 
119. Id. 
120. Becker, supra note 6, at 1679 (citing B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE 
PUBLIC 135-36 (1977}). 
121. Id. at 1680. 
122. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 983-84. 
123. Id. at 985. 
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surge in Title VII court litigation.124 Ninety-five percent of employ­
ers have never been sued in federal court, and in anyone year less 
than one-half of one percent of firms covered by Title VII can ex­
pect to be sued in a federal court.l25 In addition, the aggregate liti­
gation costs for those firms sued under Title VII, when combined 
with the budgets of the EEOC and the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs, amounts to perhaps one billion dollars, a di­
minutive fragment of this nation's multi-trillion dollar economy.126 
What about the current employee who is still working for her 
employer and is contemplating a discrimination claim? That em­
ployee must think twice. For instance, an employee who contends 
that she has been harassed or unlawfully denied a promotion may 
be legitimately concerned that the practical costs of bringing a claim 
do not outweigh the benefits available under the statute.127 The 
employee may also fear employer retaliation,128 or be concerned 
that her ongoing employment relationship will become strained as 
she continues to work with the very individuals who the employee 
has identified as alleged discriminators. Thus, "[i]n most cases, liti­
gation is a viable option only when the employment relationship 
124. In fiscal year 1993, the EEOC filed 401 court actions alleging unlawful dis­
crimination, up from 354 suits filed in the preceding fiscal year. Tho hundred and sixty 
three suits filed in fiscal year 1993 were filed under TItle VII, 114 under the Age Dis­
crimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), four 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991), 
two under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and 18 concurrently under two or 
more statutes. Charges of Disability Discrimination Boost EEOC Intake by 22% in 
Fiscal '93, 1994 DAILY LABOR REp. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 13, 1994). 
125. John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment 
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1599 (1992). 
In fiscal year 1993, the EEOC recovered $126.8 million through the EEOC admin­
istrative process (an increase from the $117.7 million obtained in fiscal year 1992) and 
another $34.2 million through litigation (down from the fiscal year 1992 total of $35 
million). Charges ofDisability Discrimination Boost EEOC Intake by 22% in Fiscal '93, 
1994 DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 13, 1994). 
126. Donohue, supra note 125, at 1600. 
127. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1031. TItle VII claimants may 
view the costs and benefits differently now that the statute provides for compensatory 
and punitive damages in cases involving intentional discrimination. See supra note 84 
and accompanying text. 
128. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a) (1988). 

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 

against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has 

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub­

chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
Id. 
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has been broken off (or never exis.ted)."129 
III. "DISCRIMINATION" 
Title VII generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.13° In discussing the 
meaning and concept of discrimination actionable under Title VII 
as part of the assessment of the impact of the statute, we must ad­
dress a "less familiar conceptual question-what do we mean by 
discrimination?"131 More specifically, what do we mean by employ­
ment discrimination? 
The term "discrimination" is not defined in Title VII;132 hence, 
the undefined statutory prohibition is "uninformative about the 
role of discriminatory effects, the appropriate burdens of proof and 
production, and the mechanisms for filtering out discriminatory 
treatment."133 In the absence of such express direction and infor­
mation set out in the statute, courts will fill in the statutory gaps and 
open questions, through the norm-ridden exercise of developing 
gap-filling rules, and will fashion and implement devices responsive 
to the courts' view of how the statute should be read and under­
stood.134 Thus, the judiciary has the discretion to define "discrimi­
nation" as it holds that certain acts are or are not discriminatory 
within the meaning of Title VII. What norms and concepts of dis­
crimination have the courts utilized 10 making that 
determination?135 
As a general matter, racial discrimination may be overt or in­
stitutional. Overt discrimination occurs when "a harm is inflicted 
or a benefit withheld either because of the perpetrator's racial bias 
against the victim or because of that perpetrator's obliging the ra­
cial prejudice of others. "136 Thus, an employer who refuses to hire 
129. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1032 (footnote omitted). 
130. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for the full text of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a) (1988). 
131. Kelman, supra note 13, at 1159. 
132. See BROOKS, supra note 55, at 55; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983). 
133. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 118 (1990). 
134. Id. 
135. This discussion of concepts of discrimination is not intended to be exhaus­
tive. In addition to the concepts addressed herein, the reader may wish to examine the 
four categories of discrimination set forth by Professor Mark Kelman in a recent article. 
See Kelman, supra note 13, at 1164-1204. 
136. GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM & JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 9 (1991); see also Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 
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African-Americans due to the employer's discriminatory bias, or 
because the employer is concerned with the reactions of her biased 
customers or employees, engages in overt discrimination.137 
Institutional discrimination occurs when an employer uses 
practices that are ostensibly race-neutral but nevertheless have an 
adverse impact on African-Americans as a group.138 Suppose, for 
example, that an employer sets "neutral" qualification require­
ments for a particular position. If some or many African-Ameri­
cans lack those qualifications or skills because of the past and 
present effects of de jure and de facto discrimination,139 purport­
edly neutral job requirements will disqualify African-Americans at 
a disproportionate rate relative to whites. In that circumstance, Af­
rican-American unemployment and underemployment will result, 
even where the employer is not engaging in overt discrimination. 
A. Title VII Discrimination Analyses 
The two principal concepts and definitions of Title VII employ­
ment discrimination formulated by the Supreme Court are dispa­
rate treatment and disparate impact.14o Both concepts were 
discussed in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States: 
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of 
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less fa­
vorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or 
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 123-26 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 
1991) (discussing the victim and perpetrator perspectives of discrimination). 
137. EZORSKY, supra note 136, at 9. 
138. Id. I note my conclusion that facially neutral laws are not in fact neutral 
because those laws are enacted, operated, and enforced against a cultural background 
of racism. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1152 (1993). "Neutral rules cannot do 
justice to the thickly embedded historical nature of American prejudice." Id. at 1153. 
139. Given the past and present discrimination against African-Americans, it is 
not surprising that many individuals who are black may not possess the educational 
background or the employment skills and experience that an employer may seek when 
selecting a work force. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. 
Cr. REV. 99, 114-15 ("[C]enturies of discrimination explicitly based on race have forced 
some characteristics on blacks-on all blacks, simply because they are black, since that 
was the basis of the discrimination."). 
140. There are four general categories or theories of discrimination relevant to 
the interpretation and application of Title VII: disparate treatment, disparate impact, 
policies or practices which perpetuate in the present the effects of past discrimination, 
and failure to make reasonable accommodations to an employee's religious observance 
or practices. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 66, at 1 (footnote omitted). In this Arti­
cle, I focus on disparate treatment and disparate impact. 
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national ongm. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, 
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact 
of differences in treatment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment 
was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted 
Title VII. ... 
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from 
claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employ­
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of dif­
ferent groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than 
another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of 
discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate im­
pact theory. Either theory may, of course, be applied to a partic­
ular set of facts.141 
1. Disparate Treatment 
Disparate treatment analysis takes a restnctIve view of the 
question of discrimination and downplays the significance of out­
comes.142 The analysis looks to individual justice, equality of op­
portunity, equal treatment, and equal process (the process of 
employer decision-making rather than the results reached through 
that process).143 On that view, the primary objective of antidis­
crimination law is to "prevent future wrongdoing rather than to re­
141. 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (citations omitted). The Teamsters Court 
also addressed the relevance of Title VII § 703(j) to the use of statistics as an eviden­
tiary tool in employment discrimination cases. That section provides, in pertinent part: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer ... 
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or 
to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such 
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect 
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin employed by any employer ... in comparison with the total 
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work 
force in any community, State, section, or other area. 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(j) (1988). In Teamsters, the Court concluded that § 7030) was irrel­
evant because statistical evidence was useful in discrimination cases and statistical dis­
parities were often a "telltale sign" of intentional discrimination. 431 U.S. at 339-40 
n.20. 
142. See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma­
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1342 (1988); 
see also Joel W. Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action: 
The Access Principle, 65 TEX. L. REv. 41,47 (1986) (disparate treatment is a fault-based 
notion of discrimination, with liability occurring as the result of demonstrated racial 
animus). 
143. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: 
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of 
Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971). 
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dress present manifestations of past injustice."144 
Title VII disparate treatment theory requires proof of racial 
animus and discriminatory motive; thus, a plaintiff must show that 
an employer treats members of protected groups differently and 
less favorably than it treats others because of their race. Evidence 
of intentional discrimination may be difficult or impossible to se­
cure, for few employers are brazen enough to express their discrim­
inatory reasons and provide the plaintiff with "smoking gun" 
evidence when making employment decisions.145 Moreover, evi­
dence of intentional discrimination is often difficult or impossible to 
secure, as discriminatory motives may be disguised as neutral 
acts.146 
Given the substantial difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of 
disparate treatment discrimination, plaintiffs typically resort to the 
burden shifting framework set out by the Supreme Court in Mc­
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green147 and Texas Department of Com­
munity Affairs v. Burdine.148 To prevail under that methodology, a 
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment dis­
crimination by a preponderance of the evidence. ' Such a showing is 
"proof of actions taken by the employer from which discriminatory 
animus [can be inferred] because experience has proved that in the 
absence of any other explanation it is more likely than not those 
actions were based on impermissible considerations."149 If a plain­
tiff establishes a prima facie case, the court must then consider the 
employer's justification for the presumptively discriminatory prac­
tice or action. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate 
a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its challenged actions. 
However, the employer need not prove that it was actually moti­
vated by the proffered reasons.150 If the employer meets that bur­
den, it has rebutted the inference of discrimination created by the 
144. Crenshaw, supra note 142, at 1342. 
145. See ARlHUR LARSON & LEX LARSON, 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
§ 86.30, at 17-46 (1993). 
146. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1986-87 (1990); 
see generally Theodore Eisenberg & Sherri L. Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We 
Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991). 
147. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see George Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of 
Proof" Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment Discrimina­
tion, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 43 (1993) (arguing for reform of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework). 
148. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
149. Fumeo Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978). 
150. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. 
244 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:219 
prima facie case.151 The plaintiff must then demonstrate that the 
employer's articulated reason for the employment practice or ac­
tion is pretextual.152 
Given the relative ease in establishing the plaintiff's prima facie 
case and the employer's articulation of a legitimate, non-discrimina­
tory reason, the vast majority of disparate treatment cases turn on 
the question whether the plaintiff can establish that the employer's 
articulated reason for its action was in fact pretextual.153 While it 
was generally presumed that the pretext inquiry was the final step 
of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, a recent Supreme 
Court decision called for an additional step. In St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks,154 the Court held that the trier of fact's rejection of 
the employer's asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
its challenged actions did not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a 
matter of law. Thus, a plaintiff who establishes that the employer's 
proffered reason was in fact pretextual must also establish that the 
employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of 
race or other protected status.155 The factfinder's disbelief of the 
reasons put forward by the employer may suffice to show inten­
tional discrimination, stated the Court, but the rejection of the de­
fendant's reasons does not compel judgment for the plaintiff since 
the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.156 Under the 
Court's "pretext-plus" approach,157 for example, a plaintiff could 
establish that the employer's assertion that the plaintiff was dis­
charged for absenteeism was in fact not true, but the plaintiff would 
still fall short of proving disparate treatment. Hicks requires the 
plaintiff to go beyond establishing pretext. The plaintiff must also 
151. Id. at 253. 
152. Id. at 256. Professo'r Richard Epstein has argued that the McDonnell Doug­
las scheme reflects a dramatic shift in Title VII litigation and shifted the statute away 
from a color-blind orientation to a protected-class limitation. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, 
supra note 90, at 177. However, as noted by Professor George Rutherglen, Epstein 
exaggerates the effect of McDonnell Douglas and fails to take into account the Supreme 
Court's decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 n.6 
(1976), wherein the Court held that white employees can also bring discrimination 
claims under Title VII. See Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1474. 
153. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 66, at 1155-56. 
154. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
155. Id. at 2749. 
156. Id. 
157. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The 
Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS 
L.J. 57 (1991). 
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introduce evidence that the basis for the challenged treatment was 
race or other protected status. 
Hicks increases the plaintiff's burden in disparate treatment 
cases. As noted by Justice Souter in dissent, the Court's ruling 
"saddles the victims of discrimination with the burden of either pro­
ducing direct evidence of discriminatory intent or eliminating the 
entire universe of possible nondiscriminatory reasons for a person­
nel decision. "158 
By telling the factfinder to keep digging in cases where the plain­
tiff's proof of pretext turns on showing the employer's reasons to 
be unworthy of credence, the majority rejects the very point of 
the McDonnell Douglas rule requiring the scope of the factual 
enquiry to be limited, albeit in a manner chosen by the employer. 
What is more, the Court is throwing out the rule for the benefit 
of employers who have been found to have given false evidence 
in a court of law. There is simply no justification for favoring 
these employers by exempting them from responsibility for 
lies.159 
158. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
159. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The point made by 
Justice Souter is best illustrated by an example found in Victoria A. Cundiff & Ann E. 
Chaitovitz, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Lots ofSound and Fury, but What Does It 
Signify?, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 147 (Winter 1993-94). An employer contends that an 
employee was fired because the employee was habitually late. The plaintiff establishes 
that this reason is pretextual by showing that employees not in the protected class had 
far worse records of tardiness but were not disciplined, let alone discharged. The em­
ployer actually discharged the plaintiff because its best customer asked the employer to 
give the plaintiffs job to the customer's son. Id. at 148. Under the pretext-only ap­
proach, the employer would lose because its proffered reason for the discharge-tardi­
ness-was pre textual. Under the pretext-plus approach, the employer would lose only 
where the plaintiff proved that the tardiness reason was pretextual and presented addi­
tional evidence that the employer discharged the plaintiff because of the plaintiffs pro­
tected status. [d. 
The discussion of the foregoing example does not capture the full dimension of the 
problems and issues raised by the pretext-plus approach. Assume that the employer's 
reason for the discharge was proffered du~ng discovery, and was therefore set forth in 
sworn depositions and sworn responses to interrogatories. In that circumstance, the 
sworn testimony that tardiness was the reason for the discharge would be false testi­
mony given under oath, and any rule of law that does not discourage or ferret out such 
untruths is fundamentally flawed. Assume further that absent a truthful answer to the 
question of why the plaintiff was discharged, it is not likely that the plaintiff will know 
that she lost her job because the customer asked the employer to hire his son. Absent 
knowledge of the real reason, how can the plaintiff prepare her case and engage in 
discovery relative to the real reason? 
Moreover, an employer who withholds ~he real and true reason for an employment 
action can gain a tactical advantage. If the pretextuality of its stated reason is not 
proven, the employer may continue to conceal the true reason. If pretextuality is estab­
lished, why should the employer be allowed to use its ace in the hole, the real reason, to 
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Title VII disparate treatment analysis, as developed by the 
Supreme Court and applied by the lower courts, does not ade­
quately address substantive inequalities existing at the time of dis­
covery of racial bias and discrimination. As noted above,160 
evidence of intentional discrimination is difficult (if not impossible) 
to secure, as discriminatory acts are often concealed or disguised as 
"neutral" acts.161 In addition, the adverse effects of past and pres­
ent discrimination in housing, education, and other areas have 
placed many African-Americans and other people of color at a dis­
tinct disadvantage as they seek to enter and compete in the job 
market. 
Consider, for example, an African-American job applicant 
who, because of past and present discrimination and subordination, 
has grown up in a high-rise housing project, attended an un­
derfunded and second class segregated school, and received an in­
ferior education. That applicant enters an applicant pool 
containing whites who have received first-rate educations at ade­
quately funded schools. Before choosing from among the appli­
cants, the employer requires each applicant to take an entry-level 
exam covering basic math and English.162 While it is possible that 
the African-American applicant will score as high or higher than 
the white applicants, it is more likely that the white applicant with a 
good or excellent education will score higher than the African­
American applicant with a poor education. That result is because 
of exposure to the necessary education and skill acquisition and not 
because of skin color. The employer who makes a final employ­
ment decision on the basis of the test scores will argue that its reli­
ance on the "neutral" test does not and could not constitute 
unlawful discrimination by the employer against the African-Ameri­
can applicant. The process for each applicant was the same, and 
each applicant was treated in an "equal" fashion. Hence, the conse­
quences of such acts and practices linger, and the reality of the dis­
advantage continues to exist and has a real-world impact in the job 
block the plaintiffs attempt to prove her case? And why should the litigants and the 
court have any confidence that a party that has concealed the true reason for its actions 
is now telling the truth when it presents the so-called real reason? Again, why should 
the law countenance such behavior? 
160. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
161. See Spann, supra note 52. See generally Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 
146 (the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination is revealed by the surprisingly 
low number of claims filed). 
162. I assume that the test is job-related and is not subject to a disparate impact 
challenge. 
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market, even when discriminatory acts and practices have been pro­
hibited as a matter of law and even though, indeed because, the 
present manifestations of past injustices are not addressed or 
remedied.163 
2. Disparate Impact 
In contrast to disparate treatment analysis, disparate impact 
theory is expansive, stresses equal achievement and equality as a 
result, and views the question of discrimination from a group per­
spective.164 Under the disparate impact approach, "actual decisions 
must meet some standard of proportionality-for example, the pro­
portion of blacks or women in the applicant pool or the general 
population."165 The disparate impact model thus 
looks to the outcome of the race. It relates to the actual distribu­
tion of jobs among racial classes and is concerned with both the 
quantity and quality (measured, for example, by pay level and 
social status) of the jobs. Jobs should be distributed so that the 
relative economic position of Negroes ... is approximately equal 
to that of whites. Disproportionate unemployment and under­
employment of blacks should be eliminated or substantially 
reduced.166 
The remediation and rectification of discrimination through 
disparate impact analysis must extend to the group and to the 
group's members.167 The analysis recognizes a "group right in the 
sense that the locus of the claim to just results is in the group; 
claims of individuals to participate in these results are derived by 
virtue of group membership. "168 
The Supreme Court recognized and applied the disparate im­
pact model in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.169 In Griggs, the 
163. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
164. See RONALD TURNER, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE AcrlON 7 
(1990). 
165. Julie O. Allen et aI., A Positive Theory of the Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 16 J. CORP. L. 173, 175 (1991). 
166. Fiss, supra note 143, at 237-38 (footnote omitted). 
167. TURNER, supra note 164, at 7. 
168. Paul N. Cox, The Supreme Court, Title VII and "Voluntary" Affirmative Ac­
tion-A Critique, 21 IND. L. REV. 767, 785-86 (1988); see also Friedman, supra note 142, 
at 48-49 (stating that equal achievement "is by nature a relative concept because it 
assesses equality by gauging the respective shares of employment opportunities enjoyed 
by various race, gender, or other groups"). 
169. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For commentary on Griggs, see FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, 
supra note 90, at 192-204; Alfred W. Blumrosen, Griggs Was Correctly Decided-A 
Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 443 (1986); Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An 
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Court held that Title VII prohibited employment practices that dis­
qualified a disproportionate number of African-Americans unless 
the practices were justified by business necessity po The Court 
wrote that, under Title VII, "practices, procedures, or tests neutral 
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be main­
tained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimina­
tory employment practices."171 As stated by the Court: 
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment 
or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in 
the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On 
the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and 
condition of the job-seeker be taken into account. It has-to re­
sort again to the fable-provided that the vessel in which the 
milk is proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes 
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in 
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business 
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude 
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited.172 
In addition, the Griggs Court stated that "good intent or ab­
sence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment proce­
. dures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for 
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."173 
Congress "directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of em­
ployment practices, not simply the motivation,"174 and "placed on 
the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement 
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in 
question."175 
Thus, the Griggs Court determined that so-called objective cri­
teria may be unlawful under Title VII when those criteria have an 
adverse impact affecting members of a protected group (e.g., wo­
men and African-Americans) at a significantly and disproportion­
ately higher rate than they affect individuals outside the protected 
Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employ­
ment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985); 
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory ofDiscrim­
ination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987). 
170. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
171. Id. at 430. 
172. Id. at 431. 
173. Id. at 432. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
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group.176 Proof of such disparate impact is invariably quantitative 
and focuses on the actual operation of a system or the operation of 
a system if applied to a population of potential applicants.177 Statis­
tical evidence of the disparate impact is viewed as not merely cir­
cumstantial but as "direct evidence of the results which [would] 
trigger the demand for additional justification" by the employer.178 
One purpose of the disparate impact theory, as formulated by 
the Griggs Court, was to facilitate the identification of discrimina­
tory situations where, through either inertia or insensitivity, em­
ployers were following policies that gratuitously and needlessly 
(although not necessarily deliberately) excluded African-Ameri­
cans (or other members of a protected class) from equal employ­
ment opportunitiesP9 On that view, good faith or the absence of 
discriminatory intent or animus does not render lawful the dispa­
rate impact of an employment practice unrelated to business neces­
sity or job performance.180 Consider, again, the example noted 
above regarding the African-American job applicant,181 and assume 
176. One test used to determine disparate or adverse impact is set forth in the 
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures ("Uniform Guidelines"), 29 
C.F.R. § 1607.4(0) (1993). Under the Uniform Guidelines, a test or other selection 
device will normally be deemed to have an adverse or disparate impact if it has a "selec­
tion rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty 
percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate." Id. 
An example of the 4/5 rule is found in Marion G. Sobol & Charles J. Ellard, Meas­
ures of Employment Discrimination: A Statistical Alternative to the Four-Fifths Rule, 10 
INDUS. REL. L.J. 381 (1988). Suppose that of 500 white applicants se~king a position, 
400 are selected for employment (an 80% ratio). Suppose, further, that of 500 African­
American applicants, 200 are selected (a 40% ratio). If the African-American selection 
ratio (4O%) is divided by the white selection ratio (80%), there is an impact ratio of 
50%. Because the 50% impact ratio is less than the 4/5 or 80% percent benchmark of 
the Uniform Guidelines, an adverse or disparate impact on African-American appli­
cants would be established. Id. at 389. 
For criticism of the 80% rule, see Elaine W. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in 
Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978). 
For an alternative to the rule, see Sobol & Ellard, supra. 
177. See DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DIS­
CRIMINATION 47 (1980). 
178. [d. at 47-48. The statistical models and methodology employed in Title VII 
disparate impact cases are beyond the scope of this Article. For discussions of those 
subjects, see Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989); BALDUS & COLE, supra 
note 177, at 44-51, 53-75; WALTER B. CONNOLLY ET AL., USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION §§ 2 & 3 (1992). 
Also beyond the scope of this Article is any explication of the use of standard 
deviations in employment discrimination cases. See generally WAYNE C. CURTIS, STA­
TISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR ATTORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1983). 
179. Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992). 
180. See TURNER, supra note 164, at 144-45. 
181. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. 
250 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:219 
that the employer's test and related employment decisions dispro­
portionately exclude African-Americans. Under disparate treat­
ment theory, the employer could argue that all applicants had been 
treated alike and that it had not discriminated against (i.e., had no 
racial animus toward) the African-American applicants. Under 
Griggs and its progeny,182 the fact that the employer treated each 
applicant equally in terms of taking the test, and had no racial ani­
mus toward the applicant, would not be dispositive. Instead, the 
employer could be required to justify the use of the test and to 
prove that the test was job-related or was related to business 
necessity. 
For many, the notion that an employer could violate Title VII 
without intending to do so was, and is, controversial.183 The princi­
pal prohibitions of Title VII did not refer to the disparate impact 
theory, and the only provision of the statute that even arguably al­
luded to the theory protected professionally developed tests that 
182. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (holding that unlawful dis· 
crimination may exist when the employer's statistics appear to favor minorities); New 
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (holding that dismissal 
of employees who are in a methadone drug treatment program may be job·related); 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that height and weight require­
ments for prison guards has a disparate impact on women, and is not job-related since 
no correlation was shown between height/weight and ability to perform the job); Al­
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (holding that discriminatory tests are 
impermissible unless they are shown to be job related-i.e., that they are predictive of 
job performance). 
183. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 169 (arguing that violation of Title VII should be 
found only when the discrimination was intentional). Professor Steven Greenberger 
has written that the answer to the question whether Griggs was wrongly decided de­
pends upon the manner in which a court should read a statute. 
The text of Title VII is ambiguous as to whether the use of a non-job-related 
selection device which disproportionately excludes minorities is illegal. If, as 
Justice Scalia believes, the text is all that a court should consider in interpret­
ing a statute, then it is hard to know how the case should have been decided. 
Alternatively, if, as is traditional, the legislative history of the statutory lan­
guage is considered as well, then the available evidence suggests that Title VII 
should not have been read at the time to incorporate impact doctrine. That 
conclusion, too, however, is not wholly certain because the doctrine was never 
directly debated by Congress. Finally, if the statute is read so as to further the 
congressional purpose in enacting it, then there is a strong argument that 
Griggs was correctly decided. Congress was concerned with more than the 
immorality of explicit racial exclusion, abominable and pervasive though it 
was. Congress was concerned as well with what it termed the "economic 
waste" of high African-American unemployment, because it devastated the 
lives of African-Americans and dampened the economic productivity of the 
nation. 
Greenberger, supra note 56, at 266-67 (footnotes omitted). 
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were not used as a pretext for discrimination. l84 Nevertheless, the 
Griggs disparate impact analysis was effective until approximately 
1977, at which time its usefuln~ss was limited by Supreme Court 
decisions "that imposed procedural barriers in the way of class ac­
tions, eliminated seniority systems from the scope of the theory, 
and made the plaintiff's initial showing of adverse impact much 
more complicated."185 One of those decisions, Hazelwood School 
District v. United States,186 set out the required inquiry into the 
proper definition of the labor market and the methods of demon­
strating underrepresentation of specific groups in an employer's 
work force. 187 That decision "transformed proof of disparate im­
pact from [a] simple matter ... to a highly technical issue on which 
expert testimony usually must be taken. Only if a plaintiff sur­
mounts this initial hurdle under the theory of disparate impact is 
any burden of proof placed upon the defendant. "188 
Despite the fact that Griggs was the law of the land for eight­
een years, it was not accepted by the Reagan Administration.189 In 
a 1988 decision, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,190 the Supreme 
Court held that the disparate impact analysis could be applied to 
subjective employment criteria.191 A plurality of the Court also 
concluded, inter alia, that a disparate impact plaintiff had to identify 
184. Rutherglen, supra note 169, at 1298. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides, in 
pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un­
lawful employment practice for an employer ... to give and act upon the 
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its 
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to 
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). 
185. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1476 (footnote omitted). See Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (holding that the relevant statistical compari­
son is between the racial composition of the teaching staff and that of the teacher popu­
lation and not between the African-American teachers and students in the school); East 
Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (holding that in order to 
qualify as a class action, the class must make a pretrial motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23 to be certified as a class); Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 
(1977) (hOlding that § 703(h) protects bona fide seniority systems from Title VII chal­
lenges even if they perpetuate pre-Title VII discrimination). 
186. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
187. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1476. 
188. Id. 
189. Former Reagan Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried "concen­
trated on what [he] cared about: taming Griggs, with its pressure toward quotas ...." 
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRST. 
HAND ACCOUNT 119 (1991). 
190. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
191. Id. at 999. 
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the specific employment practices causing the disparate impact,192 
and that the employer bore a burden of producing a legitimate busi­
ness justification for its practices but did not bear the burden of 
persuasion.193 According to former Solicitor General Charles 
Fried, the Watson decision "gave us our signal to press for a more 
thorough re-examination of what the lower courts had been doing 
in Griggs-type cases."194 
Fried's efforts were successful, as Griggs was effectively dis­
mantled by the Court's 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., 
Inc. v. Atonio.195 In that decision, the Court established higher evi­
dentiary standards for Title VII disparate impact plaintiffs trying to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on statistics, and 
concluded that the use of bottom-line statistics were not sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case.196 The Wards Cove Court also held 
that section 7030) was relevant to the use and role of statistics in 
Title VII cases,197 and concluded, for the first time, that causation 
was an element of the disparate impact analysis.198 The business 
necessity defense was changed to a legitimate business-justification 
defense (which included a cost justification defense), and the Court 
imposed the burden of production (but not persuasion) on 
employers.199 
Congress addressed and reversed significant aspects of Wards 
Cove in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA").2°O The CRA codi­
192. Id. at 994. 
193. Id. at 997. 
194. FRIED, supra note 189, at 227 n.64. 
195. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
196. Id. at 650-5l. 
197. This view of § 703(j) is different from the view expressed by the Court in its 
Teamsters decision. See supra note 14l. 
198. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 656. 
199. Id. at 659; see Belton, supra note 67, at 926. For commentary on Wards Cove, 
see SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 205-07; Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting 
Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins 
and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359 (1990); L. Camille Hebert, Redefining the Bur­
dens of Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards 
Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1990); Mack A. Player, Is 
Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) On Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Ronald Thrner, The Rehnquist Court and Title VII Disparate Im­
pact Theory: Atonio's Burden Allocation and the Retreat from Griggs, 16 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 139 (1989); Leland Ware, Resurrecting Racial Barriers, 38 Loy. L. REV. 39 (1992). 
200. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified 
as amended in various sections of 2 U.S. C., 29 U.S.c., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 
2000e). The Civil Right Act ("CRA") overturned a number of employment discrimina­
tion decisions issued by the Supreme Court in the 1989 and 1990 terms, "expand[ed] the 
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims 
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fied the disparate impact theory and a causation requirement;201 re­
jected the Wards Cove legitimate business justification defense and 
replaced that defense with one requiring the employer to "demon­
strate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity;"202 and placed the 
burdens of persuasion and production on employers.203 At least 
two issues, however, were left unresolved. First, Congress did not 
decide whether section 7030) was relevant204 or irrelevant205 to the 
use of statistical evidence in Title VII cases. Second, the congres­
sional codification of the job-relatedlbusiness necessity standard did 
not define those terms,206 and thus left in place the questions, 
of discrimination," CRA § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071, and found that "additional remedies 
under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimina­
tion in the workplace." CRA § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071. See generally Kingsley R. Browne, 
The Civil Rights Act of1991: A "Quota Bill," A Codification ofGriggs, a Partial Return 
to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 287 (1993) (examining 
effect of Civil Rights Act of 1991 on disparate impact theory of discrimination as it 
relates to affirmative action); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of1991: A Brief 
Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial 1nterpretation, 68 No­
TRE DAME L. REV. 923 (1993) (criticizing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as ambiguous, 
resulting in giving courts tremendous interpretive power). 
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 1992). 
202. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992). 
203. The "term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of production and per­
suasion." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(m) (Supp. IV 1992). 
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
206. Resort to legislative history to define or give meaning to the terms is prohib­
ited by the CRA itself. Section 105(b) of the CRA provides: 
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 
Congressional Record S. 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered 
legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in constru­
ing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove-Busi­
ness necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice. 
CRA § 105(b), 105 Stat. at 1075. Even if resort to the legislative history was permissi­
ble, the history on this particular point is not helpful, for the interpretive memorandum 
referred to in § 105(b) provides: 
The final compromise on S. 1745 agreed to by several Senate sponsors, includ­
ing Senators DANFORTH, KENNEDY, and DOLE, and the Administration states 
that with respect to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative 
business practice-the exclusive legislative history is as follows: 
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended to reflect 
the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
When a decision-making process includes particular, functionally-inte­
grated practices which are components of the same criterion, standard, 
method of administration, or test, such as the height and weight requirements 
designed to measure strength in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), 
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equivocations, and ambiguities which characterized disparate im­
pact law prior to Wards Cove.207 
In sum, disparate impact analysis allows plaintiffs to establish 
violations of Title VII even though they have no evidence that an 
employer deliberately excluded African-Americans or women or 
other people belonging to a protected class from equal employment 
opportunities. In theory, that approach permits plaintiffs to evade 
the practical problem and very real difficulty of coming up with 
"smoking gun" evidence of overt discrimination and racial animus. 
The initial and prima facie view is that the absence or "under­
representation" of African-Americans or other protected groups in 
an employer's work force is not mere happenstance. Nevertheless, 
an employer may demonstrate that unlawful discrimination is not 
the cause of the composition of its work force, and plaintiffs cer­
tainly may encounter difficulties in establishing a disparate impact 
cause of action.208 
B. Economic Models of Discrimination 
What is the relationship between the "market" and discrimina­
tion?209 What are the implications of that relationship for employ-
the particular, functionally-integrated practices may be analyzed as one em­
ployment practice. 
137 CONGo REc. S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth). 
207. Belton, supra note 67, at 931; Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1477. 
208. For example, a disparate impact plaintiff must now demonstrate that each 
particular challenged practice causes a disparate impact unless the plaintiff can demon­
strate to the court that the elements of an employer's decision making process are not 
capable of separation for analysis; if the plaintiff makes the latter demonstration, the 
decision making process may be analyzed as one employment practice. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992). 
Plaintiffs must satisfy the causation element only if the employer uses a multi­
criteria selection practice and the criteria cannot be disaggregated. If the deci­
sionmaking process can be disaggregated, then bottom-line statistics, which 
the Court apparently disapproved of in Wards Cove, are insufficient to estab­
lish a prima facie case. 
Belton, supra note 67, at 928 (footnotes omitted). The standard for determining when 
multi-criteria selection practices (for example, education, tenure, job title, job perform­
ance, and the subjective evaluations of supervisors) can or cannot be disaggregated are 
not set out in the statute and will be defined by courts presented with that issue. Id. 
"Moreover, employers seeking to minimize liability in disparate impact cases may be 
encouraged to adopt multi-selection decisionmaking procedures that lend themselves to 
disaggregation." Id. at 929. 
209. For general information on this relationship, see MATS LUNDAHL & ESKIL 
WADENSJO, Unequal Treatment: A Study in the Neo-Classical Theory of Discrimina­
tion (1984); DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees 
eds., 1973); ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (Emily P. Hoffman ed., 
1991). 
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ment discrimination law? Do markets end or at least reduce 
discrimination, or do markets foster discrimination?210 Is there 
anything in an economic analysis of antidiscrimination law that can 
better inform our view of, and judgments with respect to, Title VII? 
Is discrimination sometimes rational?211 Two general types of labor 
market discrimination advanced by neoclassical economists-taste 
discrimination and statistical discrimination-2I2are discussed in 
this section. 
1. The Taste for Discrimination 
Professor Gary Becker213 has posited that if an individual has a 
"taste for discrimination," he must act as ifhe were willing to pay 
something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to 
be associated with some persons instead of others. When actual 
discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either payor forfeit in­
come for this privilege. This simple way of looking at the matter 
gets at the essence of prejudice and discrimination.214 
210. Milton Friedman and others have argued that employment discrimination 
laws are unnecessary because free markets would address the problem of discrimina­
tion. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). In Friedman's view, 
antidiscrimination 
legislation involves the acceptance of a principle that proponents would find 
abhorrent in almost every other application. If it is appropriate for the state to 
say that individuals may not discriminate in employment because of color or 
race or religion, then it is equally appropriate for the state, provided a major­
ity can be found to vote that way, to say that individuals must discriminate in 
employment on the basis of color, race or religion. The Hitler Nuremberg 
laws and the laws in the Southern states imposing special disabilities upon 
Negroes are both examples of laws similar in principle to [antidiscrimination 
law]. 
Id. at 113. 
211. Consider the following view: 
We don't so much operate irrationally in an otherwise sound world as create a 
world with irrationality built into its very structure. Once we create a world 
where race matters, we become unaware of our creation's contingency. Racial 
generalizations come to seem natural, a sort of baseline, "the way things are." 
What· now seems irrational is to hire a black or let one in your law school. 
These decisions require "affirmative action" and are thus morally troublesome 
. . . . Individual actions work in concert ineluctably to reinforce the racial 
status quo. It feels like freedom, like individual choice. Yet the effect is 
tyranny. 
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
212. Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 
228 (1986). 
213. For a discussion of pre-Becker economic theories of discrimination, see 
LUNDAHL & WADENSJO, supra note 209, at 8-20. 
214. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971). 
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Emphasizing the words "as if," Becker notes that an individual 
must act as if she were "willing to forfeit income in order to avoid 
certain transactions. "215 In his view, an employer who refuses to 
hire blacks solely because the employer erroneously underesti­
mated their economic efficiency engages in discriminatory behavior 
"not because he is prejudiced against them but because he is igno­
rant of their true efficiency. Ignorance may be quickly eliminated 
by the spread of knowledge, while a prejudice (i.e., preference) is 
relatively independent of knowledge."216 
Generally, the taste for discrimination will have a greater nega­
tive impact on the incomes of African-Americans, as the reduction 
in African-Americans' incomes will be proportionately greater than 
the reduction in the income of whites.217 This is so because "blacks 
are only a small part of the economy, [and] the number of advanta­
geous exchanges that blacks can make with whites is greater than 
the number of advantageous transactions that whites can make with 
blacks."218 
Assum[ing] that whites do not like to associate with [African­
Americans], but that [African-Americans] are indifferent to the 
racial identity of those with whom they associate[, t]he incomes 
of many whites will be lower than they would be if they did not 
have such a taste[, for those whites] forego advantageous ex­
changes [such as refusing] to sell their houses to blacks who are 
willing to pay higher prices than white purchasers.219 
Likewise, a racial preference and taste for discrimination held 
by whites will result in the reduction of incomes of blacks by 
preventing them from making advantageous transactions with 
whites.22o Applying that analysis in the employment context, an 
employer's decision to forego an advantageous transaction (for ex­
ample, refusing to hire an African-American applicant because of 
that individual's race) can have economic effects on both the em­
ployer and the applicant. The employer discriminates by not hiring 
the worker, thereby foregoing the utilization of that worker's skill 
in production or service,221 or will only hire that worker at a lower 
215. Id. at 16. 
216. Id. (footnote omitted). 
217. Id. at 22-24; Posner, supra note 116, at 515-16. 
218. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 352 (2d ed. 1983). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. The cost incurred by the employer in not hiring the applicant is the em­
ployer's own disutility. See Strauss, supra riote 14, at 1621-22. 
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wage.222 
Given the assumption that discrimination will result in a differ­
ence in the wages paid to whites and African-Americans (specifi­
cally, that whites will receive a higher wage than blacks (Ww > 
Wb»,223 the taste model would eliminate the effectiveness of the 
discrimination since, it is argued, labor and capital would move to 
those firms and industries that did not discriminate at all or discrim­
inated in some lesser fashion.224 Under this model, the market 
would address discrimination in the long run since labor and capital 
would shift to firms and industries that did not discriminate or that 
discriminated less.225 "[I]n the long run, people with equal ability 
will be paid equal wages, and there will be no effective, i.e, market­
observed, discrimination in wages between black and white work­
ers."226 Those firms "not in equilibrium will either pay a premium 
through reduced profits or find niches in the market where black 
workers are not necessary and where discrimination, though real, 
will not influence market wages. "227 The discriminators "will ulti­
mately be driven from the market because they indulge their 
prejudices at the expense of profits."228 
Suppose that an employer does not have a taste for discrimina­
tion, but third parties-employees or customers-do, and the third 
parties refuse to work with or be served by African-American 
222. In that circumstance, the effective cost incurred by the employer is "the sum 
of the money wage and the additional cost to the employer resulting from the taste for 
discrimination." Id. "Consequently, in order to account for the additional costs, a mi­
nority employee's money wage will be less than her marginal product." Id. 
223. Culp, supra note 9, at 983-84. 
224. Id. at 984. 

Suppose, for example, that the source of discrimination is bigoted owners. 

The refusal of bigoted owners to hire black workers will lead to black unem­

ployment, and blacks will be willing to work at depressed wages. This large 

pool of workers, who will work for wages that are below their actual produc­

tive value, provides an opening for nondiscriminating firms to earn large eco­

nomic profits. They can hire black workers, pay them some amount less than 

white workers, lower prices, and eventually drive the bigoted firms out of 
business. 
E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospects for "Putting America to 
Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. L.J. 2003, 2028 (1993). 
225. Culp, supra note 9, at 984. 
226. Id. (footnote omitted). 
227. Id. 
228. Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 753 
(1991) (footnote omitted). The conclusion that the market will eliminate racism is con­
tradicted by the view that the "United States has had a free market economy for over 
two centuries, and racism is as firmly entrenched as ever." Delgado, supra note 211, at 
1190. 
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workers.229 In that circumstance, an employer will incur additional 
costs in higher wages paid to non-minority workers with a taste for 
discrimination, or in reduced productivity by those workers.23o If a 
customer or customers have the taste for discrimination, such as a 
law firm's clients who prefer not to be represented by African­
American lawyers or restaurant patrons who prefer not to be 
served by a black waiter, the employer will incur additional costs 
because its customers are not willing, or are less willing, to do busi­
ness with firms or businesses employing African-Americans.231 
While employer recognition and acceptance of third party dis­
crimination may in some instances maximize profits, it will also re­
sult in discrimination against African-Americans, even though the 
employer has no racial animus and is not bigoted against African­
Americans. In that instance, the motivation for the employer's con­
duct is its economic self-interest.232 Thus, according to the taste 
model, the economic impact of third parties who are in a position to 
financially "punish" a nondiscriminatory employer results from the 
ability of third parties to 
[p]ressure employers in the direction of discrimination, even if 
employers would, other things being equal, choose not to dis­
criminate or have no particular view about whether to discrimi­
nate or not. Ironically, it is the failure to discriminate that 
operates as a tax on the employer's business, rather than vice 
versa. And when this is so, reliance on competitive pressures will 
force employers to behave in a discriminatory manner if they 
wish to survive.233 
On that view, market pressures create, and do not prevent, 
discrimination.234 
2. Statistical Discrimination 
Consider an employer who wishes to pay his white employees 
more than his African-American employees (Ww > Wb), but is re­
quired by antidiscrimination laws to pay equal wages to both whites 
and African-Americans (Ww = Wb).235 That employer may re­
229. See BECKER, supra note 214, at chs. 3, 4. 
230. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1622. 
231. Id. 
232. BECKER, supra note 214, at 14-15; SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 753. 
233. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, in REASSESSING 
CIVIL RIGHTS 22, 25 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1991). 
234. Id. 
235. Culp, supra note 9, at 984. 
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spond to the equal wage requirement by limiting the number of Af­
rican-Americans hired, or by hiring African-Americans who are not 
as highly skilled as (some) white workers236 and paying those Afri­
can-Americans the same wage as whites, resulting in a loss on each 
African-American hired.237 
In making the decision to limit the number of African-Ameri­
can hires or to possibly hire blacks with "lesser" skills, an employer 
may rely on proxies, stereotypes, and generalizations in predicting 
performance 
not because he hates or devalues blacks or women, or because he 
has a general desire to avoid them, or is prejudiced ... but be­
cause he believes (on the basis either of plausible assumption or 
actual experience) that the relevant stereotypes have sufficient 
truth to provide a rational basis for employment decisions.238 
When a "rational" employer who does not have a taste for discrimi­
nation nevertheless discriminates by determining that race, sex, etc., 
is a proxy for employment qualifications,239 that employer engages 
in statistical discrimination.24O 
By responding to generalizations and stereotypes and employ­
ing them as an "economically rational basis for employment deci­
sions,"241 the employer chooses to avoid the costs of inquiring into 
and establishing an individual's qualifications. Instead, the em­
ployer relies upon the proxy of race and correlates that proxy with 
qualifications. When better information about an individual's qual­
ifications is more costly to discover, "it will be rational, profit-maxi­
mizing behavior for the firm to offer lower wages to a minority 
236. Because of past and present discrimination against African-Americans and 
others, African-Americans as a group fall behind whites as a group in certain social 
indicators (for example, poverty, education, and employment), and it is therefore plau­
sible that in some contexts race and other status is "every bit as accurate a signalling 
device as, say, test score[s], education, and previous employment." Sunstein, supra note 
233, at 27. Consequently, utilization of the statistical discrimination model would harm 
African-Americans and other groups more than whites. 
237. Culp, supra note 9, at 984. An antidiscrimination law that forbids Ww > Wb 
can result in either additional information costs to the employer or a departure from the 
optimum wage (which is the "wage equal to a worker's marginal product"). Posner, 
supra note 116, at 516. Such a law reduces efficiency, which should not be confused 
with social equity. Id. 
238. SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 756. 
239. Schwab, supra note 212. 
240. Statistical discrimination is the "most significant form of racial discrimina­
tion that exists in contemporary American culture." SPANN, supra note 52, at 121. 
241. Sunstein, supra note 233, at 26. 
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employee than it would offer to a nonminority employee."242 An 
employer engaging in such discrimination does not do so because of 
a taste for discrimination or because the employer is prejudiced 
against African-Americans; rather, the employer will act on the be­
lief that the stereotypes, generalizations, and proxies related to a 
person's race, sex, or color are sufficiently true to serve as a rational 
basis for employment decisions.243 "This would be unfair to blacks 
who were in fact above average, yet might still be an efficient 
method (in the presence of high information costs) of compensating 
black workers."244 
C. Evaluation 
Taste-based discrimination (the result of an exogenous prefer­
ence)245 and statistical discrimination (the result of imperfect infor­
mation)246 both violate Title VII since an employer engaging in 
either form of discrimination treats African-Americans differently 
from the way it treats non-black workers or applicants.247 An em­
ployer who refuses to hire African-Americans because of the em­
ployer's prejudice or' bigotry, or because third parties who do 
business with the employer are prejudiced or bigoted, engages in 
disparate treatment, i.e., treats African-Americans differently and 
adversely because of their race.248 An employer who refuses to hire 
African-Americans because of stereotypes or some generalized 
view of African-Americans, or who employs selection devices or 
criteria that disproportionately exclude African-Americans, may be 
said to have engaged in disparate treatment and/or disparate impact 
discrimination.249 
Furthermore, both models of discrimination have adverse ef­
fects on the acquisition and use of human capital. The existence of 
discrimination affects individual decisions concerning education, 
employment, and the like, for rational African-Americans should 
be expected to invest relatively less in such areas given the reality 
that, because of discrimination, they will not be able to fully use the 
242. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1622. 
243. Sunstein, supra note 233, at 27. 
244. Posner, supra note 116, at 516. 




. 248. See supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text. 

249. See supra notes 142-208 and accompanying text. 
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acquired skills in the workplace.250 Consider, for example, the situ­
ation faced by African-Americans who wished to practice as attor­
neys in the not too distant past. Paul Robeson, an All-American 
athlete and Phi Beta Kappa scholar, enjoyed an international career 
as a stage, screen, recording, and concert star. Prior to embarking 
on that career, Robeson graduated from Columbia University Law 
School and worked for a New York law firm specializing in estates. 
During his brief tenure with that firm, Robeson buzzed for a ste­
nographer to take down a memorandum of law he had prepared. 
The stenographer refused to work with Robeson, stating, "I never 
take dictation from a nigger. "251 When Robeson discussed the inci­
dent with the attorney who had hired him, he was advised that his 
prospects in the law were limited since the firm's wealthy white cli­
ents were not likely to agree to let him try a case for fear that his 
race would be a detriment. The white attorney also offered to con­
sider opening a Harlem branch of the firm and putting Robeson in 
charge of the branch. Robeson resigned and never practiced as a 
lawyer again.252 Given such encounters, it is conceivable that a "ra­
tional" African-American might choose not to pursue a legal edu­
cation or, if she had obtained a law degree and met the 
requirements for admission to the practice, might expect less than 
optimal returns on that investment. 
Similarly, the taste for discrimination andstatistical discrimina­
tion may shape and adversely affect the preferences of both dis­
criminators and those who are subjected to the discrimination.253 
Discriminators may conclude that the victims of discrimination "de­
serve their fate, that they are responsible for it, or that the current 
situation is part of an intractable, given, or natural order."254 Those 
who are subjected to discrimination may be inclined to reduce the 
cognitive dissonance they experience by "adapting their prefer­
ences to the available opportunities."255 Thus, discriminators may 
prefer things as they are now, and may deny or not even be able to 
see that discrimination exists, or that it is a serious problem. Those 
who are discriminated against may not form certain preferences­
250. Sunstein, supra note 233, at 29. 
251. MARTIN B. DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON 55 (1989). 
252. Id. 
253. Sunstein, supra note 238, at 759. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. Professor Sunstein has pointed out that the "reduction of cognitive disso­
nance is a powerful motivating force: people attempt to bring their beliefs and percep­
tions in line with existing practice." Id. 
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may not prefer to be lawyers or doctors, or pursue an education, or 
other goals-because it is unlikely that they will be able to follow 
through on their preferences and achieve their goals. Statistical dis­
crimination perpetuates the effects of past discrimination and racial 
stratification,256 as there will be no legally required efforts made to 
address and redress the reality and consequences of such 
discrimination. 
In sum, the term "discrimination" encompasses actions and de­
cisions that 
treat[] an otherwise similarly qualified black, woman, or handi­
capped person less favorably than a white, male, or able-bodied 
person, whether the reason for the decision lies in malice, taste, 
selective empathy and indifference, economic self-interest, or ra­
tional stereotyping. This understanding of discrimination picks 
up not merely covert unequal treatment, but also requirements 
that are neutral "on their face" but that would not have been 
adopted if the burdened and benefitted groups had been 
reversed. 
It follows that the claim of discrimination, best understood, 
is not for prevention of certain irrational acts, or of "prejudice," 
but instead for the elimination, in places large and small, of 
something in the nature of a caste system.257 
Does Title VII effectively address the aforementioned concep­
tions of discrimination? Should the current approach to Title VII 
be scrapped in favor of other approaches? Recent proposals by 
Professors David Strauss and Derrick Bell are two vehicles for con­
sidering these questions. 
IV. THE STRAUSS AND BELL PROPOSALS 
As discussed above,258 certain aspects of the current Title VII 
regulatory regime do not advance the objective of promoting the 
access of African-Americans to the workplace in the most effica­
cious and user-friendly manner. These problems include the reali­
ties of EEOC procedures, lengthy and expensive federal court 
litigation, the paradigms of discrimination recognized by the courts 
applying Title VII, and the hoped for but unrealistic expectations 
256. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: 
Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1065 (1992) (arguing that 
the use of mandatory quotas or numerical goals in the college and graduate school 
admissions process is necessary to remedy discrimination). 
257. Sunstein, supra note 233, at 34 (footnotes omitted). 
258. See supra notes 102-29 and accompanying text. 
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regarding the extent to which Title VII can effectively address en­
trenched and arguably permanent racism. 
As the federal courts' dockets grow and the courts are increas­
ingly unable to attend to Title VII and other discrimination cases in 
a timely manner, employment discrimination cases may linger for 
years.259 The costs of litigation can be high, and the expense of 
bringing and prosecuting a Title VII suit can discourage a victim 
from pursuing a claim.260 Plaintiffs' attorneys, relying on contin­
gent fee agreements and attorneys' fees statutes, may not be able or 
willing to finance the litigation. Plaintiffs must also take into ac­
count the reduction in the real value of any monetary award result­
ing from the delay in receiving the award.261 Are there better ways 
of addressing the question of workplace discrimination under the 
law? 
A. The Strauss Proposal 
In a 1991 article,262 Professor David Strauss identified "what 
the purposes of the current generation of employment discrimina­
tion laws should be" and suggested "institutional arrangements that 
promote these purposes."263 According to Strauss, the "objectives 
of the antidiscrimination laws are not best served by trying to detect 
individual acts of discrimination. Instead, the employment discrimi­
nation laws should be designed to give employers incentives to hire 
and promote members of minority groups in proportion to their 
representation in the relevant population."264 
Professor Strauss noted two objections to the disparate treat­
ment approach to employment discrimination.265 "First, it is very 
difficult to ferret out acts of covert discrimination, and covert dis­
crimination is the form that employment discrimination is most 
likely to take today."266 Consequently, the "likelihood of error 
259. See James A. King, Jr. et aI., Agreeing to Disagree on EEOC Disputes, 9 
LAB. LAW. 97, 99 (1993) (examining problems caused by increased antidiscrimination 
litigation and the overburdened federal court system and proposing alternative dispute 
resolution as a solution). 
260. Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Reso­
lution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,6-7 (1990); King et aI., supra note 
259, at 99. 
261. King et aI., supra note 259, at 99; Summers, supra note 75, at 488, 536-37. 
262. Strauss, supra note 14. 
263. Id. at 1620. 
264. Id. 
265. On disparate treatment, see supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text. 
266. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1644. 
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under this standard is high, and the costs of administering it are 
likely to be great."267 In Strauss' view, "[t]he second problem is 
that the disparate treatment approach will be least successful at 
combatting the kinds of discrimination that are most likely to per­
sist in a competitive system."268 For Strauss, the disparate treat­
ment standard "is most effective at duplicating the work that the 
market is likely to do anyway, and least effective at doing the an­
tidiscrimination work that the market cannot do."269 The disparate 
impact standard270 is superior to the disparate treatment approach, 
argues Strauss, and "[n]umerical standards are a more efficient way 
of fulfilling the moral premises that underlie the consensus against 
discrimination."271 
Professor Strauss sketched an institutional arrangement that 
would implement his theoretical conclusions with respect to Title 
VII and employment discrimination. 
First, private individuals should not be able to bring suits for dis­
criminatory treatment under the employment discrimination 
laws. Discriminatory treatment claims should be screened in the 
way that unfair labor practice claims are currently screened by 
the National Labor Relations Board: a government agency de­
cides, on the basis of an informal investigation, whether the claim 
has merit. The agency has discretion to pursue the claim on be­
half of the individual if it wishes. If the agency does not pursue 
the claim the individual cannot. As a practical matter, even 
under this system, claims of disparate treatment could still be 
brought as state wrongful discharge actions, and in employment 
grievance proceedings.272 
According to Strauss, "the purpose of this reform would be to re­
duce the resources expended on disparate treatment claims and to 
reduce the threat of an unwarranted claim, a threat that can distort 
employers' decisions."273 
Second, Strauss would require that "every firm employ minori­
ties in proportion to their percentage in the national population. "274 




270. On disparate impact, see supra notes 164-208 and accompanying text. 
271. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1653. 
272. Id. at 1655. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
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ment, "the sanction for noncompliance 'would be a fine" which 
could be paid by employers who found it too costly to meet the 
requirements,275 and firms that exceeded the nationwide percent­
age would be rewarded.276 "The objective of this regime is to ac­
complish certain social purposes, such as deterring taste-based 
discrimination and avoiding racial stratification."277 Conceding that 
"the nationwide percentage requirement is counterintuitive,"278 
Strauss argued that the potential dislocations would be limited be­
cause the sanction for a failure to meet the standard is a fine;279 that 
allowing the numerical standard to vary by region would have nega­
tive effects;280 and that "variations in the numerical standards based 
on qualifications would allow minority employees' lack of qualifica­
tions to become barriers to their advancement. The lack of qualifi­
cations may be (very surely is, to some extent) the result of past 
discrimination, and it contributes to racial stratification. "281 
1. NLRB-Type Screening 
First consider Professor Strauss' proposal that discriminatory 




278. Id. at 1656. 
It is questionable both because it does not allow for regional variations in 
minority population and because it does not allow for variations based on the 
number of minority employees with the necessary qualifications. In the end it 
may be a poor idea. But there is, I believe, more to be said in its defense than 
might at first appear. 
Id. 
279. Discussing this fine, Strauss noted that the 
crucial question, of course, is the size of the exaction from employers who fail 
to satisfy the requirement. In principle and at a high level of abstraction, the 
fine should reflect the gains to society, net of costs, that result from racially 
proportionate hiring and compensation practices. Determining those gains 
and costs is of course quite another matter. But at least the inquiry would be 
focused in the right place-on the possible gains from combatting discrimina­
tion and the amount society is willing to pay to achieve them. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
280. Strauss stated: 

It might create an incentive for firms to locate in areas with low minority pop­

ulation. More important, the problems addressed by the employment discrim­

ination laws should be seen as national concerns. An employer can do its part 

either by hiring minority employees or by paying a fine. Firms should not be 

able to opt out of a national effort to address the problem by locating in areas 
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practice claims are screened by the National Labor Relations Board 
("NLRB" or "Board").282 Because Professor Strauss would substi­
tute the NLRB scheme for the Title VII scheme and would prohibit 
private Title VII suits,283 an overview of the NLRB process may be 
helpful,284 
Generally,285 an unfair labor practice charge alleging a viola­
tion of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")286 is filed with 
an NLRB regional office. When an employee appears at an office 
and indicates that she wishes to file a charge against the employer, 
the employee is referred to an NLRB agent (known as the informa­
tion officer).287 The agent will discuss the matter with the employee 
and will make an initial determination as to a possible violation of 
the NLRA. The employee may tell the agent that she was dis­
charged and that the employer "unfairly" failed to pay her the 
proper amount in her final paycheck.288 The information officer 
will advise the employee that her claim does not fall under the 
NLRA, that she may file a charge if she desires, and that the charge 
would be promptly dismissed.289 In most instances, the employee 
will not file a charge. 
If the information officer determines that an employee's com­
plaint involves conduct that may be a violation of the NLRA, the 
officer will assist the employee in preparing the formal charge, 
thereby initiating the unfair labor practice investigation process.290 
The charge is investigated by an NLRB agent, and the regional di­
rector decides whether an unfair labor practice complaint will be 
issued against the charged party. If a complaint is issued, the mat­
ter is prosecuted by the NLRB General Counsel (by and through 
an attorney employed in the particular regional office) and is tried 
282. See infra notes 285-308 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text. 
284. Professor Strauss states that he cannot fully defend his proposed arrange­
ment, that "the institutional particulars are matters of detail," and that "the specific 
institutional details can be worked out, on a trial and error basis if necessary." Strauss, 
supra note 14, at 1654. 
285. See JULIUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: 
THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1988); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT 
ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 7-15 (1976); EDWARD 
B. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE ApPRAISAL OF THE NLRB 15-27 (3d ed. 1986). 
286. 29 U.S.c. §§ 151-169 (1988). 
287. Conferring with an information officer prior to filing an unfair labor practice 
charge is not required. 
288. See MILLER, supra note 285, at 16. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
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before an administrative law judge ("AU"). The AU issues a rec­
ommended decision and order upholding or dismissing the com­
plaint. If no exceptions to the AU's ruling are filed by the parties 
or the General Counsel with the NLRB in Washington, D.C., the 
NLRB will generally affirm the AU's ruling. If exceptions are 
filed, the NLRB will consider the case and will issue a ruling. An 
NLRB order finding by the commissin of an unfair labor practice 
and ordering the employer to remedy the wrongful action is not 
self-executing, and the NLRB must petition a federal court of ap­
peals for enforcement of its order.291 Any person aggrieved by an 
NLRB order may seek judicial review of the order by filing a peti­
tion for review in the courts of appeals.292 
If an unfair labor practice complaint is not issued and a charge 
is investigated and dismissed by the NLRB regional office or is 
withdrawn by the charging party (over eighty percent of all charges 
are disposed of by the regional offices without the issuance of a 
formal complaint),293 the rejection of the charge by the regional of­
fice may be appealed to the General Counsel in Washington. If 
that appeal is denied, the case comes to an end since the General 
Counsel's decision not to proceed with a complaint is final and is 
not subject to judicial review.294 
Thus, the NLRB process "screens out worthless cases [and] 
saves innocent respondents huge amounts of money by shutting off 
worthless litigation at the very outset."295 In addition, screening 
"may defuse thousands of potentially serious labor disputes each 
year."296 For employees, an advantage of the NLRB scheme is that 
the government's prosecution of the employee's claim and reliance 
on the NLRB's agents in the investigation, settlement, and trial of 
the case minimizes the employee's legal costS.297 Thus, employees 
who are unable to obtain legal counsel are not for that reason fore­
closed from litigating against an employer. 
The disadvantages of the NLRB process include the politiciza­
291. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988). 
292. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988). 
293. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 267 (11th 
ed. 1991). 
294. NLRB v.- United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 
112,129-30 (1987); Summers, supra note 75, at 476. Section 3(d) of the NLRA provides 
that the General Counsel "shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect 
of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints." 29 U.S.c. § 153(d) (1988). 
295. MILLER, supra note 285, at 15-16. 
296. Id. at 16. 
297. Summers, supra note 75, at 472-73. 
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tion of the NLRB which results from the appointment of NLRB 
members who may be more sympathetic to management interests 
and concerns than they will be to labor's and individual employees' 
concerns and interests,298 and the loss of control of the case given 
the General Counsel's exclusive and final authority in deciding 
whether to prosecute or dismiss an unfair labor practice charge (re­
call that the Title VII plaintiff can file suit even if the EEOC dis­
misses her charge).299 Delay is also a concern. In 1980, the time 
expended in obtaining enforceable orders in unfair labor practice 
proceedings was approximately 1000 days.3°O In fiscal year 1988 the 
median time between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge 
and NLRB adjudication was 762 days, with an additional 430 days 
between the NLRB order and the enforcement of that order by the 
courts.30! 
It is not apparent to me that substituting an NLRB-type charge 
processing scheme for disparate treatment cases would be more ad­
vantageous than the current Title VII process. Both processes can 
involve years of litigation. Both processes will require an adminis­
trative agency to investigate the claims made and to make a deter­
mination regarding the merits of the charge. Unlike the NLRB 
process, however, the Title VII process allows the employee to de­
cide whether her case will or will not be pursued in federal court 
and does not leave that decision to a government agency. While it 
is true that the NLRB-like procedure will provide government at­
torneys to prosecute the employee's case, that benefit comes with 
the cost of relinquishing control and authority over the individual's 
claim. Depending on the particular complainant and the particular 
case, that trade-off mayor may not be advantageous. In proposing 
an NLRB-like model, Professor Strauss notes that "a government 
agency decides, on the basis of an informal investigation, whether 
the claim has merit."302 The nature of that informal investigation is 
critical. 
The NLRB conducts timely and swift investigations which 
298. Id. at 475-76. 
299. Id. 
300. COX ET AL., supra note 293, at 266. 
301. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOY. 
MENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 159 (1993). Professor Gould cites the failure of 
the NLRB to establish internal time limits for processing cases and the frequency of the 
turnover of NLRB members as some of the factors for the delay in Board adjudication 
of cases. Id. 
302. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1655. 
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must be completed within non-statutory time iargets.303 Time 
targets 
are absolutely the most important goal of the NLRB. They de­
termine whether agents get retained or promoted, whether su­
pervisors, regional directors, and agents get bonuses, and 
whether they are on the good or bad list when the region is au­
dited. With all this riding on the time targets, it is easy to see that 
they are or become the only thing that matters to many NLRB 
employees.304 
Generally, NLRB agents must conclude their investigation within 
twenty-six days from the time of the filing of an unfair labor prac­
tice charge.305 The agent must obtain affidavits and evidence from 
the charging party and that party's witnesses and obtain a response 
from the charged party. When a party or witnesses are unavailable 
or do not cooperate, the NLRB agent's ability to meet the time 
target will be impeded. "It should be easy to see that the short time 
target means that agents are tempted to leave issues unexplored 
whenever time gets tight. "306 
In addition, "the NLRB conducts tens of thousands of investi­
gations each year without ever subpoenaing a document. Why?"307 
Professor Ellen Dannin has written that she asked that question 
and was told that "subpoenas take time to get and time to enforce. 
That would cause a problem with meeting time targets. . . . It is 
more important to do a fast investigation than to do a thorough 
investigation."308 That view of the general lack of thoroughness of 
303. See Ellen I. Dannin, Labor Law Reform-Is There a Baby in the Bathwater?, 
44 LAB. L.J. 626, 628 (1993). 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. Professor Dannin also notes that "until the NLRB Union put a stop to 
it" supervisors would assign cases to Board agents while the agent was on vacation. 
Where the case was assigned at the commencement of a two-week vacation, about one­
half of the targeted investigation time would pass before the agent would even learn of 
the case and begin the investigation. Id. "Even now, it is not unusual for an agent to 
return to the office after several days away to find new cases in their in-boxes with time 
already lost." Id. 
307. Id. at 629. The NLRA provides that the Board has the power to issue sub­
poenas in its investigations or proceedings. 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1988). 
308. Dannin, supra note 303, at 629. My own experience as an NLRB agent and 
a private practitioner is generally consistent with Professor Dannin's account of time 
targets and the non-use of investigative subpoenas. The EEOC is much more aggres­
sive with respect to advising a respondent that, if necessary, it will issue a subpoena and 
will follow through on that "threat" if the respondent does not comply. 
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the NLRB's "informal investigation" should be taken into account 
when considering the Strauss proposal. 
Strauss also contends that, as a practical matter, disparate 
treatment claims "could still be brought as state wrongful discharge 
actions, and in employment grievanceproceedings."309 The use of 
state wrongful discharge actions310 as a means of redressing em­
ployment discrimination would not address Strauss' concern with 
reducing the resources expended on disparate treatment claims and 
the threats of unwarranted claims. It merely changes the forum in 
which those issues will be litigated from the federal courts to state 
courts and state administrative agencies. And where a wrongful 
discharge cause of action alleges that the challenged employment 
action constitutes a tort, the employer may be exposed to even 
greater potential liability. Moreover, many state court employment 
actions would be preempted by federal labor law311 or state fair 
employment laws.312 
Reliance on "employment grievance proceedings"313 raises ad­
309. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1655. 
310. It is not clear what Strauss means by "state wrongful discharge actions." He 
could be referring to state court lawsuits, or to employment discrimination charges filed 
with state agencies under state fair employment laws, or both. 
311. For example, the National Labor Relations Act preempts conduct that is 
arguably prohibited or arguably protected by that statute. San Diego Bldg. Trades 
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959). Conduct that is not arguably protected 
or prohibited by the NLRA can be preempted where Congress intended such conduct 
to be left unregulated so that it could be "controlled by the free play of economic 
forces." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140-41 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 
144 (1971». Other state court employment-related suits may be preempted by § 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). Caterpillar Inc. v. Wil­
liams, 482 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1987); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 
U.S. 851, 859 (1987). See also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 
406-10 (1988) (state court tort suit alleging retaliation for filing a worker's compensa­
tion claim is not preempted by § 301). 
312. For example, the Illinois Human Rights Act, III. Stat. ch. 775, §§ 1-101 to 10­
103, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race and other specified 
grounds. That state law also provides that "no court of this state shall have jurisdiction 
over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act." 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 775, para. 518-111 (Smith-Hurd 1993). The Illinois Supreme Court 
has held that the Human Rights Act preempts all common law tort claims arising in and 
out of the employment context. Mein v. Masonite Corp., 485 N.E.2d 312 (Ill. 1985). 
Thus, an African-American employee's state court action challenging alleged discrimi­
natory conduct would be preempted by the Illinois fair employment law and could not 
be maintained in state court. 
313. I assume that Professor Strauss is referring to grievance-arbitration proce­
dures found in most collective bargaining agreements. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AF­
FAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (12th ed. 1989) (98% of collective 
bargaining agreements provide for the arbitration of grievances). That type of griev­
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ditional concerns. Given the fact that only eleven percent of pri­
vate sector employees are unionized,314 almost ninety percent of all 
private sector employees would not be able to turn to labor arbitra­
tion315 to challenge any alleged discrimination.316 Other issues rela­
tive to the use of labor arbitration are whether arbitrators may use 
positive law external to the labor agreement in resolving a griev­
ance,317 the absence of a rule of stare decisis in labor arbitration (so 
that arbitrators are not as restrained as courts in their decisionmak­
ance arbitration, commonly known as "labor arbitration," should be distinguished from 
"employment arbitration," which refers to the use of arbitration in the non-unionized 
setting. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurispruden­
tial Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to 
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1188 (1993). My discussion of the Strauss proposal will 
consider both types of arbitration. 
314. Malin & Landenson, supra note 313, at 1188 n.3; PAUL C. WEILER, Gov­
ERNING TIiE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 9-10 
(1990). 
315. See supra note 313. 
316. It is projected that the percentage of workers belonging to unions in the 
United States will decline to five percent by the year 2000. See Ansley, supra note 93, at 
1766 and sources cited therein. 
317. Whether arbitrators should apply external law in ruling on grievances in ar­
bitration has been the subject of a longstanding debate. Professor Bernard Meltzer has 
argued that arbitrators should ignore the law and follow the contract. Bernard D. Melt­
zer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR, 
THE NLRB, AND TIiE COURTS 1 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967). Professor Michael Howlett 
has argued that the law must be considered when interpreting the labor agreement. 
Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB and the Courts, in THE ARBITRATOR, 
THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 67 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967). Professors Robert Mit­
tenthal and Michael Sovern have argued that arbitrators should ignore legal rules re­
quiring conduct that a labor agreement forbids but should honor statutory provisions 
prohibiting conduct that the contract requires "on the grounds that it is worse to order 
something illegal than to require some other agency to compel mandated action." 
GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 285, at 198; Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in 
Arbitration, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION 42 (Charles 
M. Rehmeus ed., 1968); Michael I. Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal 
Law?, in ARBITRATION AND TIiE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS 29 (Gerald G. 
Somers ed., 1970). 
Professor Theodore St. Antoine has urged that a labor arbitrator is the parties' 
official "reader" of the contract, and is the parties' "joint alter ego" for the purpose of 
handling the "anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial agreement." Theodore 
J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enter­
prise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977). On that view, "the 
arbitrator's award should be treated as though it were a written stipulation by the par­
ties setting forth their own definitive construction of the labor contract." Id. Professor 
St. Antoine believes that viewing the arbitrator as the official reader "would resolve the 
perennial question of what the arbitrator should do when confronted with an irreconcil­
able conflict between the parties' agreement and 'the law.' With a right good con­
science, he should follow the contract." Id. at 1142. "After all," stated St. Antoine, the 
arbitrator "is not responsible for 'enforcing' an illegal or invalid contract. Only courts 
can enforce contracts." Id. 
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ing),318 and the narrow standard of judicial review of arbitration 
awards which precludes the refusal of the courts to enforce an arbi­
tration award even when the arbitrator made a mistake of fact or 
law.319 
In addition, approximately twenty percent of nonunion busi­
nesses have some form of employment arbitration320 procedure for 
employees.321 Thus, as with labor arbitration, the vast majority of 
employees do not have access to an alternative dispute resolution 
scheme which would replace the private disparate treatment claim 
under the Strauss arrangement. The use of employment arbitration 
to resolve discrimination claims also raises a fundamental issue con­
cerning the privatization of the adjudication of public law and the 
use of private "judges" who may decide cases "on the basis of non­
legal social mores. "322 
Thus, Professor Strauss' proposal that individual disparate 
treatment claims could be channelled to "employment grievance 
proceedings" does not account for the fact that grievance proceed­
ings are not available to most employees. In any event, it is not 
readily apparent why employees would give up their right to litigate 
their claim (a right which includes the right to discovery and the 
possibility of compensatory and punitive damages )323 in exchange 
for the opportunity to arbitrate their disputes and statutory claims. 
318. FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 374­
77 (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1991); Malin & Ladenson, supra note 313, at 1197. 
319. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960), the Court made it clear that an arbitrator's award is "legitimate only so long as 
it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 597. "[S]o far as 
the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no busi­
ness overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his." 
Id. at 599. As to arbitral fact-finding, "improvident, even silly, factfinding ... is hardly a 
sufficient basis for disregarding what the .agent appointed by the parties determined to 
be the historical facts." United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 
(1987). . 
320. See supra note 313. Employment arbitration was considered and required in 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), wherein the Court held 
that a securities broker had to arbitrate an age discrimination claim because he had 
agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out of his employment when he signed a registra­
tion application with the securities exchanges. 
321. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 313, at 1188 n.5; David Lewin, Grievance 
Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An Empirical Analysis of Usage, Dynamics, and 
Outcomes, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823, 824-25 (1990). 
322. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 313, at 1189. 
323. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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2. Proportional Representation 
Professor Strauss proposes that every firm should be required 
to employ minorities in proportion to their percentage in the na­
tional population. Before turning to some specific concerns about 
and objections to the proposal, a brief comment on proportional 
representation is in order. 
One proponent of proportional representation has contended 
that 
distributive justice ... requires that individuals be awarded the 
positions, advantages, or benefits they would have been awarded 
under fair conditions. The argument ... is that only racism, if not 
of a direct and tangible sort then of an indirect and subtle sort, 
can explain the failure of racial minorities to attain their deserved 
proportion of the society's important benefits that they would 
have on the basis of their numbers in the society. From that, and 
from the assumption that racism is indisputably unfair, it follows 
that minorities have the right to claim proportional benefits for 
themselves.324 
Thus, goes the argument, "blacks would attain proportional 
success in all of society's endeavors if they were not disproportion­
ately hindered."325 And proportionality would not be discrimina­
tory because it "would naturally occur in a fair world."326 Those 
who argue for proportionality work from "the first-order principle 
that all people are inherently, randomly equal when it comes to the 
distribution of intelligence across racial and ethnic lines."327 
Underlying the proportionality principle is a notion of 
probabilities and a "way of implementing the legal concept that an 
actor's state of mind is revealed through his or her actions, and that 
the actor is found to intend the natural and probable consequences 
of his or her actions."328 The theory is that if an employer uses 
nondiscriminatory practices, over time the work force will reflect 
the pool from which workers are selected. A "sharp divergence" 
between the racial composition of the work force and the labor 
market may lead to the inference or conclusion that an employer 
has treated people differently because of their race (or gender or 
324. RONALD J. FISCUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LoGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
13 (1992). 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 5l. 
327. Johnson, supra note 256, at 1043-44. 
328. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 63 (1988) 
(footnote omitted). 
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other protected status).329 Thus, discrimination is seen and defined 
as a differential, with the definition resting upon and grounded in a 
normative theory of proportional representation.330 Again, absent 
racism and its effects, there would be no differential because society 
and the economy would presumably produce a percentage of Afri­
can-American workers proportional to the percentage of African­
Americans in the United States.331 
Others argue that the proportionality principle is an artificial 
concept which cannot withstand scrutiny. Thomas Sowell has writ­
ten that "statistical disparities are commonplace among human be­
ings."332 In his view, the "even 'representation' of groups chosen as 
a baseline for measuring discrimination is a myth rather than an 
established fact."333 For Sowell, "the presumption that groups 
would be evenly represented in various sectors and levels of society, 
in the absence of discrimination, has become a belief almost her­
metically sealed off from any logical or empirical argument. "334 
The issue, argues Sowell, "is an incremental question of multiple 
causation and perhaps policy responses."335 
Judge Richard Posner has argued that the ultimate logic of the 
proportionality principle 
is that the percentage of members of each minority racial and 
ethnic group in each desirable occupation, and in each level of 
achievement within the occupation, should be raised to equality 
with its percentage of the total population (either of the entire 
nation or, in some versions, of some region or local area). The 
proponents of racial proportional representation do not as yet 
urge adoption of the standard at complete proportional equality, 
but there seems to be no logical stopping point short of it within 
329. Id. 
330. HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 120 (199O). 
331. Johnson, supra note 256, at 1044; see also GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM & 
JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE AcrlON 32 (1991) (arguing for "approximate 
statistical parity" and the "achievement of occupational integration throughout the hi­
erarchy of employment"). 
332. THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 19 (1984). 
333. Id. "The civil rights vision focuses on groups adversely affected in statistical 
disparities. Here the relationship between discrimination and economic, educational, 
and other disadvantages is taken as virtually axiomatic. But if this apparently obvious 
proposition is taken as a hypothesis to be tested, rather than an axiom to be accepted, a 
very different picture emerges." Id. 
334. THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC­
TIVE 175-76 (1990). 
335. THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE & DECISIONS 256 (1980). 
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the structure of their argument. . . . If occupational preferences 
and abilities are not randomly distributed across all racial and 
ethnic groups, then governmental intervention in the labor mar­
kets (and in the educational process insofar as it affects occupa­
tional choice and success) will have to continue forever to secure 
proportional equality in the desirable occupations.336 
Professor Walter Williams disputes the notion of proportional 
representation and the assumption that all blacks and "[w]hite 
ethnics are identical in all occupational [and] income-relevant 
ways."337 Arguing that there is no evidence to support that assump­
tion, Williams contends that "[b]lacks appear to differ ... from 
other ethnic groups in their preferences for sports, entertainment, 
music, ... religion," and other activities.338 
Professor Strauss obviously agrees with the proponents of pro­
portional representation. In his view, African-American employees 
and applicants lack job qualifications compared to whites at least in 
part due to discrimination against them as well as their ancestors. 
The precise extent to which such wrongs are responsible for any 
relative lack of qualifications is impossible to specify. But it is 
utterly implausible to say that they are not responsible at all. 
The compensatory justice argument is that statistical dis­
crimination that cumulatively disadvantages African-Americans 
is objectionable because they would not be less qualified were it 
not for past wrongs. In a world in which no entitlements had 
ever been violated, African-Americans would not be disadvan­
taged (at least to the same extent) by statistical discrimination. 
Statistical discrimination perpetuates past wrongs; one reason to 
prohibit statistical discrimination is to try to restore people to the 
position they would have been in were it not for past wrongs.339 
3. Critique 
The Strauss proposal arguably would advance the employment 
336. POSNER, supra note 218, at 366-67. 
337. Waiter E. Williams, The False Civil Rights VISion, 21 GA. L. REV. 1119, 1127 
(1987). 
338. Id.; see also SHELBY STEELE, THE CoNTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW 
VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 114 (1990) (arguing that affirmative action has pushed 
society "toward statistically proportionate racial representation, without any obligation 
of proving actual discrimination"). 
339. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1628-29 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of 
compensatory and other categories of justice, see BERNARD R. BOXILL, BLACKS & SO­
CIAL JUSTICE 31-44 (Rev. ed. 1992); MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION & Jus­
TICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CoNSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 29-42 (1991). 
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enhancement purpose of Title VII, eliminate some of the need to 
resort to the EEOC or the courts for the purpose of challenging 
employment discrimination,340 and more effectively address taste­
based discrimination and the effects of past and present discrimina­
tion.341 The actual racial composition of the work force, and not 
disparate treatment or disparate impact, would be the factor as­
sessed in determining whether the employer had complied with its 
fair employment obligations. 
What objections and arguments could be made in opposition to 
the proposal? First, the proposal would require the nation to admit 
that discrimination not only exists, but that it exists in such a way 
and to such a degree that proportional representation is necessary. 
Such an admission would carry with it the acknowledgement that 
discrimination has limited, and continues to limit, the job prospects 
of African-Americans, and that current antidiscrimination law does 
not effectively address the negative impact of discrimination on the 
employment prospects and opportunities of African-Americans. I 
am not hopeful that those admissions will be made. It is one thing 
to discuss and recognize discrimination at a theoretical or philo­
sophicallevel. It is quite another thing to establish a national policy 
under which a percentage of jobs must be made available to Afri­
can-Americans, especially where there will undoubtedly be dissent 
as to the premise that discrimination is still prevalent in this 
society.342 . 
Second, racial stratification in the workplace would not neces­
sarily be addressed if Professor Strauss is only proposing that an 
employer's work force must reflect the percentage of African­
Americans in the national population, and is not proposing that 
specific job classifications within a particular workplace must reflect 
that percentage. For example, an employer could reach the per­
centage requirement by employing a sufficient number of African­
Americans in so-called "lower level" jobs (janitors, laborers, etc.); 
in that circumstance, the employer could meet the percentage re­
quirement even though there are a few or even no African-Ameri­
cans in professional, managerial, technical, or executive positions. 
A law firm with a "sufficient" number of African-Americans in its 
mail room and among its support staff could claim that it meets the 
340. The courts would still have to decide cases brought under the NLRB-type 
screening. 
341. See supra notes 213-44 and accompanying text. 
342. Indeed, some believe that African-Americans have an advantage in this soci­
ety. See Walter Shapiro, Unfinished Business, TIME, Aug. 7, 1989, at 12, 14. 
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proportional representation requirement even if the firm employed 
no, or only a few, African-American attorneys. 
Third, it can be anticipated that some will argue that the impo­
sition of percentage requirements on each employer constitutes an 
improper and illegal "quota." Indeed, by calling for proportional 
representation based on the percentage of African-Americans in 
the national population, Professor Strauss' proposal goes beyond 
the view that with respect to certain jobs the proper and relevant 
population is and should be limited to those individuals possessing 
the requisite skills and training for the particular job at issue.343 For 
example, it could plausibly be argued that the relevant population 
for law firms could be the number of African-Americans who hold 
law degrees and have passed a bar examination. Professor Alex 
Johnson has noted that although African-Americans comprise thir­
teen percent of the population of the United States, African-Ameri­
can lawyers represent only about 3.5% of the legal profession.344 
Under the Strauss proposal, a law firm of one hundred lawyers 
would have to employ thirteen African-American attorneys, even 
where the "relevant population" and availability of African-Ameri­
can attorneys would indicate that the firm would be "expected" to 
hire three or four African-American lawyers. 
Fourth, the speed by which the proportionate requirement 
would be achieved would have to be addressed. If an employer's 
work force did not contain the required number of African-Ameri­
cans, would the employer be required to meet the requirement im­
mediately or over a certain period of time? Would an employer 
who had not met the requirement be required to hire only African­
Americans until the proportionality requirement was met? 
Fifth, employers in areas with a low African-American popula­
tion would face greater difficulty in employing the national percent­
age than would employers in locales with a significant African­
American population. Employer A, with a facility in Wyoming or 
Idaho or other states with small black populations, would likely ar­
343. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1987). 
In determining whether an imbalance exists that would justify taking sex or 
race into account, a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in 
the employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor market or 
general population is appropriate in analyzing jobs that require no special ex­
pertise . . .. Where a job requires special training, however, the comparison 
should be with those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
344. Johnson, supra note 256, at 1054. 
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gue that the absence of African-Americans in its work force was a 
function of availability and not of discrimination.345 Employer B, 
with a facility in an area predominantly African-American (for ex­
ample, fifty percent), would not violate the law so long as its work 
force was twelve to thirteen percent African-American.346 Under 
the Strauss proposal, Employer A would violate the law and would 
be subject to a fine; Employer B would not violate the law even 
though its work force was not "representative" of the area in which 
it operated.347 
Sixth, adoption of the Strauss proposal would require a change 
in the established public policy set forth in Title VII which forbids 
preferential treatment on account of an imbalance in the em­
ployer's work force.348 Proposals to amend TItle VII to require that 
the percentage of African-Americans in an employer's work force 
match the percentage of African-Americans in the national popula­
tion would certainly be met with anguished howls of quotas, reverse 
discrimination, etc., and the political prospects of enacting such leg­
islation would, in my view, be next to impossible.349 
Seventh, the Strauss proposal mentions only African-Ameri­
cans and does not include other protected groups, people of color, 
or women.350 If the proportional representation principle were ex­
tended to include all such groups, an employer's task would be 
more complicated. 
Having made these points, it must be said that aspects of the 
Strauss approach are not unprecedented. Consider the obligations 
imposed by law on federal contractors. Executive Order 11246 
("Order"), signed by President Lyndon Johnson in September 
345. John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil 
Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713,1733 (1991). 
346. Id. 
347. Id. 
348. See Title VII § 7030), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20) (1988). Nothing contained in 
Title VII 
shall be interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential treat­
ment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin of such individual or group ... on account of an imbalance 
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of 
any race ... in comparison with the total number of percentage of persons of 
such race ... in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the avail­
able work force in any community, State, section, or other area. 
Id.; see BLuMRosEN, supra note 44, at 250-53. 
349. On politics and Title VII, see infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text. 
350. Becker, supra note 6, at 1674. 
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1965,351 bars discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or na­
tional origin by federal contractors.352 Under the Order and its im­
plementing regulations issued and enforced by the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP"),353 federal government 
agencies are required to include in their contracts with businesses 
an equal employment opportunity clause which commits the em­
ployer to treat job applicants and employees without regard to their 
status and membership in a protected group.354 The Order also re­
quires government contractors to take affirmative action (including 
written affirmative action programs) to ensure that the nondiscrimi­
nation directive is met.355 Employers who fail to comply with the 
requirements of the Order are subject to penalties and sanctions 
including debarment.356 
OFCCP regulations provide that an employer covered by the 
Order must prepare a utilization analysis and include that analysis 
in its affirmative action program. The employer must analyze all 
major job groups at covered facilities and consider eight factors in 
determining whether minorities or women are currently being un­
derutilized (underutilized being defined as "having fewer minorities 
or women in a particular job group than would reasonably be ex­
pected by their availability").357 Where the analysis reveals un­
351. Equal Employment Opportunity, 3 C.F.R. 339-48 (1964-65 Comp.). The 
reach of the Order is broad. Apart from governments and educational institutions, one­
half of all employees are employed by businesses required to file statements with the 
EEOC setting forth the sex, race, and ethnic distribution in the employer's occupational 
classifications. Approximately 75% of those employees covered by the reporting re­
quirement are employed by federal contractors. See TURNER, supra note 164, at 87; 
Finis Welch, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINA­
TION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 154 (Steven Shulman & Wil­
liam Darity, Jr. eds., 1989). 
352. See generally NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN AD­
MINISTRATION 115-20 (1988) (outlining the primary OFCCP enforcement tools and at­
tempted changes in regulations). 
353. Revised Order No. 14, 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1993). 
354. TURNER, supra note 164, at 87. 
355. Id. 
356. Executive Order 11246, §§ 206-208. 
357. Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b) (1993). The eight factors for 
minority utilization are: (1) the population in the labor area surrounding the facility; 
(2) the size of the minority unemployed in the labor area surrounding the facility; (3) 
the percentage of the minority work force as compared with the total work force in the 
immediate labor area; (4) the general availability of minorities having the requisite 
skills in the immediate labor area; (5) the availability of minorities having the requisite 
skills in a reasonable recruitment area; (6) the availability of promotable and transfera­
ble minorities within the contractor's organization; (7) the existence of training institu­
tions capable of training persons in the requisite skills; and (8) the degree of training a 
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derutilization, the contractor must develop goals and timetables358 
to address the underutilization and must put forth "every good': 
faith effort'; to meet the goals and make the overall affirmative ac­
tion program work.359 
Although the OFCCP requirements are different from and do 
not go as far as the proposal made by Professor Strauss, my point is 
that the federal government has put into place and has followed a 
regulatory scheme which looks to the number of minorities in a per­
tinent population and labor force, measures the employer's compli­
ance with equal employment opportunity law by comparing the 
number (utilization) of minorities in the employer's work force with 
the number of minorities in the relevant population who possess the 
requisite skills, and requires the employer to address any underu­
tilization in specific job groups and categories through the setting of 
goals and timetables and other actions. Thus, a governmental role 
and involvement in regulating and promoting the employment of 
minorities consistent with some notin of prportionality is not a for­
eign or novel idea; indeed, it is an established feature of federal law. 
For those who believe that Title VII and other antidiscrimina­
tion laws should be interpreted and enforced in a manner that pro­
motes some type of proportionality in the employment of African­
Americans and other protected groups, the Strauss proposal will be 
appealing. The statutory and litigatory focus on the question 
whether an employer has engaged in disparate treatment and un­
lawful discrimination against an individual would be replaced by a 
focus on the question of whether an employer employed a specific 
percentage of African-Americans. While the latter question would 
appear to be easier to answer than the former inquiry, the Strauss 
proposal would require a profound change in currently held and 
accepted views of equal employment law and public policy, as well 
as the acceptance of a new approach to the question of discrimina­
tion in the workplace. 
B. The Bell Proposal 
In his most recent book,360 Professor Derrick Bell tells the 
contractor is reasonably able to undertake as a means of making all job classes available 
to minorities. Id. 
358. Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12 (1993). 
359. Id. 
360. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE 
OF RACISM (1992). 
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story of the "Racial Preferences Licensing ACt."361 Under that act, 
all employers, proprietors of public facilities, and owners and man­
agers of dwelling places, homes, and apartments could apply to the 
federal government for an expensive license authorizing the license 
holder and its managers, agents, and employees "to exclude or sep­
arate persons on the basis of race and color."362 Once the license 
was obtained, the holder would be required to pay to a government 
commission a tax of three percent of the income derived from 
whites employed or served, or products sold to whites during each 
quarter in which a "racial preference" policy was in effect.363 Li­
cense fees and commissions would be placed in an equality fund 
and would be used to underwrite black businesses, to offer no-inter­
est mortgage loans for black home buyers, and for scholarships for 
black students seeking a college or vocational education.364 
Licenses were to be displayed prominently in a public place, 
and businesses operated in accordance with the racially selective 
policies set out on the license. No license was available for those 
who would hire one black person and then discriminate against 
other black applicants; thus, the license could not be used as a 
shield against discrimination suits.365 
Where a facility was charged with discrimination and did not 
hold a license, a charging party would bear the burden of proof and 
361. In assessing Professor Bell's story, it is important to know where he is com­
ing from. 
[B)lack people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those hercu­
lean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary "peaks 
of progress," short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns 
adapt in ways that maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact 
that all history verifies. We must acknowledge it, not as a sign of submission, 
but as an act of ultimate defiance. 
Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted). Bell also assumes that racism is a permanent component 
of American life. 
The goal of racial equality is, while comforting to many whites, more illusory 
than real for blacks. For too long, we have worked for substantive reform, 
then settled for weakly worded and poorly enforced legislation, indeterminate 
judicial decisions, token government positions, even holidays. I repeat. If we 
are to seek new goals for our struggles, we must first reassess the worth of the 
racial assumptions on which, without careful thought, we have presumed too 
much and relied on too long. 
Id. at 13-14. 
362. Id. at 48. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. at 48-49. The equality fund would be administered by a commission com­
prised of representatives from, and named by, five civil rights organizations, with each 
representative to serve one, nonrenewable three-year term. Id. at 49. 
365. Id. 
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could meet that burden with statistical and circumstantial evidence, 
as well as direct evidence provided by white testers.366 Successful 
complainants would be entitled to damages of ten thousand dollars 
per instance of unlicensed discrimination, including attorneys' 
fees.367 
In Professor Bell's story, the President made the following 
statement at the signing ceremony for the act: 
It is time ... to bring hard-headed realism rather than well-inten­
tioned idealism to bear on our long-standing racial problems. 
Policies adopted because they seemed right have usually failed. 
Actions taken to promote justice for blacks have brought injus­
tice to whites without appreciably improving the status or stan­
dards of living for blacks, particularly for those who most need 
the protection those actions were intended to provide. 
Within the memories of many of our citizens, this nation has 
both affirmed policies of racial segregation and advocated poli­
cies of racial integration. Neither approach has been either satis­
factory or effective in furthering harmony and domestic 
tranquility.368 
The President also pointed out that three decades after the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that statute's protective function, 
"particularly in the employment area, had been undermined by 
both unenthusiastic enforcement and judicial decisions construing 
its provisions even more narrowly."369 
Bell, through the fictional lawyer-prophet and heroine Geneva 
Crenshaw,370 sets out three advantages of the preference licensing 
act. First, the authorization of racial discrimination would remove 
the element of the compelled association of whites with blacks. 
With that element removed, "people who discriminate against 
blacks without getting the license authorized by law, may not retain 
the unspoken but real public sympathy they now enjoy. They may 
be viewed as what they are: law breakers who deserve punish­
ment."371 Second, a requirement of publication of discriminator 





370. Geneva Crenshaw was the fictional heroine in Bell's 1987 book on race and 
the law. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RA. 
CIAL JUSTICE (1987). 
371. BELL, supra note 360, at 61. 
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right to discriminate "may dilute both the financial and the psycho­
logical benefits of racism."372 Racists deny that they are racists, and 
few racists "are ready to post their racial preferences on a public 
license and [are] even less ready to make direct payments for the 
privilege of practicing discrimination."373 Third, African-Ameri­
cans would no longer "have to divine" whether an employer or re­
altor or proprietor wanted to exclude them. "The license will give 
them-and the world-ample notice. Those who seek to discrimi­
nate without a license will place their businesses at risk of serious, 
even ruinous, penalties. "374 
Assuming arguendo that such a Racial Preference Licensing 
Act could be enacted into law, would entities apply for the license, 
and in what numbers? Applying for and displaying the license en­
tails a public admission that an entity discriminates or wishes to re­
serve the right to discriminate against African-Americans. Would 
the applicant be reluctant to view and identify itself as a discrimina­
tor or a racist or a metaracist?375 My guess is that the vast majority 
of those who are and who believe that they are discriminators will 
not wish to display that fact, while other possible applicants will not 
view themselves as discriminators in need of a license. 
Columnist Clarence Page has pointed out an example of the 
denial of racism. A school district in Aurora, Illinois was charged 
with a thrity-year pattern of the following discriminatory treatment: 
providing used textbooks to minority schools and new textbooks to 
white schools; forced busing of minority students and voluntary 
busing of whites; and funneling of white students into "gifted" 
classes with classrooms, bathrooms and entrances separate from the 
other, primarily minority, students.376 The lawyer defending the 
school district, faced with these facts, did not see racism. In his 
words: "Racist to me is a conscious attitude, like running around 
with hoods and white sheets."377 Evidently, anything goes in the 
372. Id. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. at 62. 
375. A racist is bigoted and is prejudiced against another person because of the 
color of the other person's skin and acts on that prejudice to disadvantage another. 
"Metaracism" occurs when "[r)acial degradation continues on a different plane, and 
through a different agency: those who participate in it are not racists-that is, they are 
not racially prejudiced-but metaracists, because they acquiesce in the larger cultural 
order which continues the work of racism." Robinson, supra note 29, at 49 n.133. 
376. Clarence Page, Integration Stalls and Nobody Has Any Answers, BIRMING· 
HAM NEWS, Feb. 24, 1994, at llA. 
377. Id. 
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absence of hoods and sheets. 
How would an employer covered by the preference act weigh 
the costs of the expensive license, the payment of the quarterly tax, 
and the possible damages of ten thousand dollars per instance of 
discrimination against the probability of a discrimination action and 
the prospects of success in the event such a charge is brought? My 
guess is that, either consciously or unconsciously, the employer will 
act on the basis of its aversion to the risk of litigation. That risk 
may be low. As noted above, in anyone year less than one-half of 
one percent of all firms covered by Title VII can expect to be 
sued.378 Given those odds and the realities of processing and liti­
gating discrimination claims faced by Title VII claimants, an em­
ployer may forego the expensive license and choose instead to 
vigorously defend against any discrimination action brought against 
it. To the extent that many or most employers would make that 
choice and not pay for the license, many of the current problems 
relative to Title VII would not be eliminated or minimized since, 
under both disparate treatment analysis379 and the licensing act, a 
claimant could still be required to prove that the employer engaged 
in unlawful discrimination. 
Other questions and arguments against the licensing act can be 
anticipated. Imagine the probable political response to a law pro­
posing to establish another tax and a new government commission 
during a time in which tax cuts, balanced budgets, and reinventing 
and streamlining government are topics of the day. Imagine the 
probable . political response to the payment of commissions into an 
equality fund used for African-American businesses, no-interest 
mortgages for black home buyers, and scholarships for black stu­
dents. Imagine the cries of "reverse discrimination." Imagine the 
call for an explication of the reasons why other people of color and 
women are not entitled to the same benefit. Imagine the legislative 
"debate" over such a law and the sight of politicians scurrying for 
political advantage or political cover. 
What I cannot imagine is the enactment of such a law. Like 
the Strauss proposal, Professor Bell's licensing act would require 
the nation to "fess up;" to acknowledge that slavery, apartheid, Jim 
Crow, and de facto and de jure discrimination harmed and continue 
to adversely affect many African-Americans, and to commit to a 
new legal approach and regime of antidiscrimination law. It is my 
378. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
379. See supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text. 
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view that this nation will not agree or commit to such a fundamen­
tal change in its discourse on racism. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewed from the perspective of the statutory goal of opening 
employment opportunities for African-Americans, the extant Title 
VII regulatory regime is problematic. While it is customary to pres­
ent some profound recommendations for a definitive resolution of 
the problems, the truth of the matter is that legal scholars have of­
fered sundry proposals geared toward "fixing" Title VII, including 
changing evidentiary standards, fault theories, procedures, and lia­
bility provisions.38o One scholar has even argued that Title VII is 
ineffective because the "Hobbesian foundation [of the statute] de­
nies us an ism-free society."381 
I am concerned that the hope that Title VII would and will 
enhance African-American employment may be unrealistic and un­
realized for, as discussed above,382 the current and principal use of 
Title VII is to protect the jobs of incumbent workers. Given that 
reality, we must ask whether too much faith has been placed in the 
legal prohibition against employment discrimination, and "whether 
we must be content with laws against employment discrimination 
that do little more than protect the rights of employees who have 
already found a measure of success in the workplace. "383 
Resisting the temptation to restrict this Article to the theoreti­
cal, I am also concerned that proposed changes in the regulatory 
regime such as those offered by Professors Strauss and Bell will run 
into the brick walls labeled "quotas," "reverse discrimination," and 
"taxes."384 This is not to say that efforts to address and resolve 
380. See Reginald L. Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes's Empirical Natural Law 
on Title VII's Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 609 (1993). 
381. Id. at 612 (footnote omitted). In the cited article, Professor Reginald Robin­
son argues "Title VII cannot rest on Hobbes's empirical natural law and simultaneously 
eliminate racial discrimination in employment practices." Id. at 677. In his view, we 
should supplant Hobbes's empirical natural law with Hegel's ethical theory. "By so 
doing, Title VII advances us toward the full realization of the Ideal in objective reality: 
an und fur sich." Id. (footnote omitted). 
382. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. 
383. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1479. 
384. See generally THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACflON: 
THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992) (arguing 
that the issues of race, rights, and taxes have intersected with a range of domestic issues, 
resulting in a chain reaction in which a new conservative voting majority has replaced 
the once-dominant democratic presidential coalition, and that a polarization has pitted 
major segments of society against one another). 
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problem areas in the regulatory scheme should not be addressed. It 
is to say that we must be realistic about, and prepared to deal with, 
the fact that there may not be any short-term or long-term pros­
pects that Title VII will be interpreted differently than it has been 
by the courts in recent cases, or that new legislation embodying al­
ternative views will be enacted.385 
For four reasons, Title VII will continue to have limited impact 
in the area of increasing African-American employment. First, 
there is a built-in and real world disincentive to the filing and pur­
suit of an EEOC charge by an applicant or employee. An applicant 
may not have sufficient information on which to base a charge and 
may understandably be more concerned with the search for em­
ployment than with instituting an administrative proceeding and 
possible litigation.386 An incumbent employee may choose not to 
institute Title VII proceedings against her employer because she 
fears that doing so will place a strain on the employment relation­
ship and will expose her to retaliation.387 
Second, the statute must be enforced by and in the courts, and 
plaintiffs face a host of practical and substantive hurdles as they 
seek to prove that their employer engaged in unlawful discrimina­
tion.388 Moreover, Title VII must be interpreted and applied by 
federal judges, a majority of whom are Reagan-Bush appointees 
and many of whom believe that "Title VII cannot be a significant 
agent in removing the vestiges of our long history of racial discrimi­
nation."389 As the effectiveness of Title VII is directly tied to the 
interpretation of that statute's provisions by the federal judiciary,390 
a predominant judicial view that the statute cannot be a significant 
agent can result (indeed, has resulted) in a restricted application of 
the statute. Although many will argue that the restricted applica­
tion is "good" or "bad" from their perspectives, the point is that the 
reach of the statute can be limited by the judicial branch.391 
Third, general reliance on the judiciary to apply and enforce 
Title VII (or any other antidiscrimination law) presents a set of in­
385. Cf Kelman, supra note 13, at 1161. 
386. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. 
387. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
388. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text. 
389. Culp, supra note 9, at 967. 
390. Id. at 970 ("Title VII can be effective in altering the economic position of 
black Americans, but its effectiveness is tied to the interpretation of that law by federal 
judges. "). 
391. Of course, certain Title VII cases can now be tried to a jury. Whether juries 
will reach results similar to those reached in bench trials remains to be seen. 
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stitutional factors which can limit the efficacy of Title VII. Many 
believe that the proper and limited role ofthe judiciary is to resolve 
disputes brought to the courts by parties, with the parties present­
ing their cases "within well-established, pre-existing legal 
frameworks" and arguing "their positions according to rigorously 
enforced notions of relevance. "392 In deciding the cases before 
them, the courts are to consider only the facts proved and the argu­
ments made by the parties. The courts' remedial choices are lim­
ited by the absence of the sword or purse393 and, in statutory cases 
like Title VII, by the remedial provisions of the statute. It has been 
argued that, given institutional limitations, the courts have not 
played a major role in the area of civil rights.394 Professor Gerald 
Rosenberg, "finding that the courts contributed little to civil 
rights,"395 argues that the combination of "growing civil rights pres­
sure from the 1930s, economic changes, the Cold War, population 
shifts, electoral concerns, [and] the increase in mass communica­
tion ... created the pressure' that led to civil rights."396 On that 
view, principal reliance on Title VII and the courts that interpret 
and apply the statute (including, of course, the Supreme Court) is 
misplaced.397 
Fourth, it must be recognized that Title VII addresses the back 
end of a process that began many years earlier. Persons seeking 
employment bring with them the advantages and disadvantages, ed­
ucation and lack of education, skills and lack of skills that were ac­
quired or not acquired in the formative years of their lives. Title 
VII will not directly address racism, poverty, and associated social 
ills such as an inadequate education, family instability, welfare de­
392. Lillian R. BeVier, Judicial Restraint: An Argument from Institutional Design, 
17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 7, 9 (1994). 
393. Id. 
394. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
395. Id. at 169. 
396. Id. 
397. Professor Girardeau Spann has argued that the "Supreme Court functions to 
perpetuate the subordination of racial minorities in the United States .... For structural 
reasons, the institutional role that the Court is destined to play within our constitutional 
scheme of government is the role of assuring the continued subordination of racial mi­
nority interests." SPANN, supra note 52, at 5. In his view, 
a rational minority response to the veiled majoritarian nature of the Supreme 
Court would be to abandon efforts to influence the Court and to concentrate 
minority political activities on the representative branches, because minorities 
are more likely to secure concessions from an overtly political branch of gov­
ernment than from a branch whose political dimensions are covert. 
Id. at 99. 
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pendency, crime, inadequate housing and homelessness.398 A prin­
cipal focus on the back end issues (employment and employment 
opportunities) with little or no focus on the front end issues will not 
address or change the underlying conditions facing African-Ameri­
cans and other disadvantaged persons. Nor will Title VII have any 
real impact on the spatial mismatch399 resulting from the movement 
of jobs to the suburbs and away from residentially segregated and 
hypersegregated African-Americans. 400 
As we continue to address and seek answers for the question 
of discrimination, we must recognize that the passage of civil rights 
legislation in the mid-1960s, while undoubtedly significant, has not 
solved (indeed, could not solve) the seemingly intractable and wors­
ening economic and social problems faced by many in the African­
American community. We must also recognize that Title VII, as 
currently written, construed and enforced, cannot reach its lofty 
goal of increasing the employment o.f, and employment opportuni­
ties available to, African-Americans. Any proposed changes in the 
statute must take account of the pitfalls and limitations facing such 
proposals. The failure to consider these limitations could result in 
the exchange of one set of problems for a different set of statutory 
obstacles-again failing to address and resolve the identified ineffi­
cacies of the current Title VII regulatory regime. 
398. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEG­
REGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS, 130-31 (1993). 
399. A recent article by Professors Douglass Williams and Richard Sander dis­
cussed the "spatial mismatch" theory. That theory posits that "firms have simply 
moved ... jobs to the suburbs, and that residential segregation has prevented blacks 
from following them." Williams & Sander, supra note 224, at 2020. That theory, first 
advanced by John Kain, see John Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and 
Metropolitan Decentralization, 82 Q. J. ECON. 175 (1968), notes that as jobs move from 
cities .to suburbs, "mass transportation systems failed to provide adequate access for 
low-wage workers, and the higher costs of commuting could seriously reduce the attrac­
tiveness of low-wage work." Williams & Sander, supra note 224, at 2021: 
400. As commentators Massey and Denton note: 

residents of hypersegregated neighborhoods necessarily live within a very cir­

cumscribed and limited social world. They rarely travel outside of the black 
enclave, and most have few friends outside of the ghetto. This lack of connec­
tion to the rest of society carries profound costs, because personal contacts 
and friendship networks are among the most important means by which peo­
ple get jobs. Relatively few job seekers attain employment by responding to 
ads or canvassing employers; most people find jobs through friends, relatives, 
or neighbors, and frequently they learn of jobs through acquaintances they 
know only casually. 
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 398, at 161 (footnote omitted). 
